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Fighting Corruption of the Historical Record: 
Nazi-Looted Art Litigation 
Jennifer Anglim Kreder 
 
For the first time in history, restitution may be expected to continue for 
as long as works of art known to have been plundered during a war 
continue to be rediscovered. 
—Ardelia R. Hall1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, with a few praiseworthy exceptions, U.S. courts have 
dismissed many claims to recover Nazi-looted art on technical grounds, 
causing distortion of the historical record.2  This trend seems to reflect 
bias against these historical claims arising from a lack of historical 
knowledge.3  Tales of venerated institutions,4 such as the Museum of 
Modern Art (MoMA), acquiring what they knew or should have known 
was trafficked and laundered art may seem outrageous to those unaware 
of the infection of the market with art that had been stolen or extorted 
from Jews between 1933 and 1945. 
Even when judges recognize the plausibility of such claims,5 
attending to them requires judicial fortitude and dedication to sorting 
                                                          
   Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College 
of Law, Northern Kentucky University; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.  The views 
expressed in this Article are those of the author only and are not necessarily those of the Kansas Law 
Review, Inc., its editors, or staff.   
 1.  Ardelia R. Hall, The Recovery of Cultural Objects Dispersed During World War II, 25 
DEP’T ST. BULL. 337, 339 (1951). 
 2.  See infra Appendix A, Federal Holocaust-Era Art Claims Since 2004 (Oct. 26, 2012) 
[hereinafter App. A]. 
 3.  See infra Part II (detailing how judicial decision-making is prone to bias against Holocaust-
era claims). 
 4.  Rachel Dubin, Museums and Self-Regulation: Accessing the Impact of Newly Promulgated 
Guidelines on the Litigation of Cultural Property, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 101, 101 (2010) (“As 
ethical guardians of the arts, museums are among the most trusted secular institutions in the United 
States.”). 
 5.  See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that there may be 
sufficient evidence to support a claim that a drawing was stolen by the Third Reich). 
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through emotionally difficult and complex factual evidence spanning 
many years.6  Regardless of this difficulty and complexity, it is 
imperative that our courts cease the recent trend of dismissing Holocaust-
era art cases on impermissible predicates.7  In such cases, courts often 
fail to recognize the need for the assistance of historians to appreciate 
how seemingly voluntary transactions were in fact the consequences of 
forced sales—usually with proceeds having been paid into blocked 
accounts—or sales made under duress to secure flight from the Third 
Reich.8 
This Article does not call for judges to ignore technical defenses, 
such as statutes of limitation, which would require judges to act in 
contravention of currently applicable law.9  Instead, this Article seeks to 
shed light on which claims and affirmative defenses are actually 
plausible when the true history of Holocaust-era spoliation and 
contemporaneous and post-war trafficking is taken into account.  Part II 
details how judicial decision-making, especially under current 
plausibility pleading standards, is prone to bias against Holocaust-era art 
claims.  Part III lays out essential historical facts that are necessary to 
determine whether a given claim to Holocaust-era art is plausible.  Part 
IV analyzes the rash of federal court dismissals, and demonstrates how 
courts could have avoided improper dismissals via judicial notice of 
obvious historical facts and testimony from historians to understand 
allegations requiring more thorough explanation.  Part V concludes that 
federal judges should pay keen attention to history to guard against bias 
creeping into their opinions, which constitute public historical records 
about the Holocaust. 
                                                          
 6.  See, e.g., Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the Museum: A 
Proposed Solution to Disputes over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 15, 36 (1998) (“[A] matter 
involving a claim for an artwork stolen during World War II will take between seven and twelve 
years to resolve.”); Press Release, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York, United States 
Announces $19 Million Settlement in Case of Painting Stolen by Nazi (July 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July10/portraitofwallysettlementpr.pdf (providing 
that, as recently as 2010, the case that launched the modern era of Nazi-looted art restitution was 
settled after twelve years). 
 7.  See infra Part IV. 
 8.  See infra Parts III, IV. 
 9.  The author is of the opinion, in light of museums and collectors filing unfair declaratory 
judgment actions, the law should be changed, but this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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II. JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING, BIAS, AND PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING 
What judges think of their function and task undoubtedly informs 
their understanding of their power of jurisdiction.  Although judges 
should remain objective, judges are human and their experiences 
necessarily influence their opinions about whether certain claims are 
viable.10  Additionally, if a judge views the factual allegations of a 
complaint as implausible at first blush, then the judge may be 
predisposed to grant a motion to dismiss the case on technical grounds 
before the expensive, time-consuming discovery phase gains much 
traction.11  As one study posited: “[O]ne would predict that an individual 
judge will be more likely to dispose of a case on procedural or technical 
grounds where he lacks particularly strong views or unique expertise in 
the substantive area of law at issue.”12 
One key procedural ground, of course, is a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
conjunction with an axiomatic common law rule in the federal system 
that requires a federal judge ruling upon a motion to dismiss to accept all 
                                                          
 10.  One article explains this point particularly well: 
Our study demonstrates that judges rely on the same cognitive decision-making process 
as laypersons and other experts, which leaves them vulnerable to cognitive illusions that 
can produce poor judgments.  Even if judges have no bias or prejudice against either 
litigant, fully understand the relevant law, and know all of the relevant facts, they might 
still make systematically erroneous decisions under some circumstances simply because 
of how they—like all human beings—think. 
Chris Guthrie, et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 829 (2001); accord 
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 378 (2d ed. 1991) (relaying 
shocking admissions by two judges about prejudices influencing their adjudications); Evan R. 
Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1036–46 (2002) (discussing the influences 
of judges’ past experiences upon their decision-making). 
 11.  See Guthrie, et al., supra note 10, at 783 (“[J]udges make decisions under uncertain, time-
pressured conditions that encourage reliance on cognitive shortcuts that sometimes cause illusions of 
judgment.”); see also LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: IS PSYCHOLOGY 
RELEVANT? 12 (1999) (“Each justice is only human, and being human means sometimes making 
decisions that are self-serving or in other ways biased.”). 
 12.  Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choices, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 
J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 632 (1994); see also RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 110 (1995) 
(positing that most judges are “ordinary judges” although “[s]ome judges have had political 
agendas”).  But see Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment 
on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 648 (1993) (critiquing Macey’s analytical framework and 
positing that many judges seek to build their reputations); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and 
Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. 
L. REV. 245, 260 (1995) (noting that “we have no good explanations of how the incentives judges 
face affect the norms they articulate”). 
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of a complaint’s allegations as true.13  However, recent Supreme Court 
decisions have caused some to question whether the axiom still rings 
true.14  As recently stated by two scholars evaluating Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly15 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal16: 
[T]he Supreme Court’s purpose in developing a more careful judicial 
review of pleadings was clear: More thorough review is necessary to 
protect against frivolous and purely speculative lawsuits.  Such cases 
take a considerable toll on the judicial system, wasting scarce judicial 
resources, delaying justice for meritorious cases, and burdening 
defendants with “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming” 
discovery.17 
In today’s post-Twombly–Iqbal climate, the standard by which 
federal courts determine whether a claim is viable appears to be higher 
than ever.18  The Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal “has ushered in 
the era of so-called ‘plausibility pleading,’ which . . . has resulted in 
significant confusion as lower courts attempt to decipher its meaning and 
impact.”19  According to the Court, “[d]etermining whether a complaint 
states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
                                                          
 13.  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (holding that 
when faced with a motion to dismiss, courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as 
true); accord Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 
163, 164 (1993) (same). 
 14.  See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 passim (2010) (investigating the impact of recent Supreme 
Court pleading cases). 
 15.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 16.  129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 17.  Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of 
Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1109 (2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557–60, 560 n.6). 
 18.  Id. at 1143–46.  See generally Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 53 (2010) (explaining how the “New Pleading” after Twombly and Iqbal is focused on factual 
sufficiency, with the purpose of “screening out meritless cases.”); Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff 
Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1997 (2010) (comparing pleading standards before and after Twombly and Iqbal); 
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010) (examining implications of the plausibility standard in pleadings); 
Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010) (proposing a “plain 
pleading” theory as an alternative to both notice and plausibility pleading); Suja A. Thomas, The 
New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010) (evaluating the similarity of the motion to dismiss and summary judgment 
standards after Twombly and Iqbal). 
 19.  Schwartz & Appel, supra note 17, at 1108–09. 
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common sense.”20  A number of courts have extended the standard to 
affirmative defenses as well,21 and the time-bar affirmative defenses are 
key in Holocaust-era restitution cases.22  Predictably, the impact of 
Twombly and Iqbal has been disproportionately felt in those categories of 
claims where key evidence is uniquely in the hands of the defense—and 
will not be forthcoming unless and until it is compelled in the discovery 
phase.23  The new standard also skews results in claims that do not seem 
to comport with “common sense” because they require a deeper level of 
knowledge to understand them. 
Even before Twombly and Iqbal, many would presume at first blush 
that historical claims, such as claims to Holocaust-era assets, surely must 
be time-barred.24  Such claims are also expensive, complicated, and time 
consuming,25 but not more so than other complex litigation, like tobacco 
cases.26  Although our society has become accustomed to complex 
                                                          
 20.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 21.  See Ryan Mize, Note, From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1260–61 (2010) (assessing 
lower court decisions applying plausibility pleadings to affirmative defenses as of 2010). 
 22.  See infra Part IV. 
 23.  See Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the 
Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 927 (2010) (discussing how in cases where intent is at 
issue plaintiffs will have inherent difficulty at the pleading stage because “plaintiffs cannot get those 
documents without discovery, meaning they likely cannot get the documents at all”); A. Benjamin 
Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 481 (2008) (observing that under the new 
pleading standards “although discovery might reveal facts that prove liability, that opportunity is 
preemptively foreclosed and the investigation for supporting facts that the rules contemplate never 
occurs.  Indeed, it is a greater shame that discovery is foreclosed . . . in circumstances where the 
needed supporting facts lie within the exclusive possession of the defendants . . . .”). 
 24.  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Reparations for Slavery and Other 
Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 689 (2003) (“Victims of historical injustices who 
have no positive law claim against wrongdoers often seek reparations from governments, and 
occasionally they obtain them.”). 
 25.  See Monica Dugot, International Law Weekend Panel on Litigating the Holocaust in U.S. 
Courts, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 389, 390 (2006) (“The emotional and financial costs 
associated with litigation are high.  The legal costs can easily end up being a sizable percentage of 
the actual value of the work.  Indeed, the legal costs can easily exceed the value of the work.”); 
Lerner, supra note 6, at 36 (“[A] matter involving a claim for an artwork stolen during World War II 
will take between seven and twelve years to resolve.”); Marilyn Henry, Holocaust Victims’ Heirs 
Reach Compromise on Stolen Art, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 16, 1998, at 3 (reporting that Thomas 
Kline, a successful plaintiffs’ attorney in the field, has stated: “I am almost at the point where I 
would say that if the art is worth less than $3 million, give up.”); see also HOWARD J. TRIENENS, 
LANDSCAPE WITH SMOKESTACKS: THE CASE OF THE ALLEGEDLY PLUNDERED DEGAS 95 (2000) 
(describing financial realities of bringing a successful claim). 
 26.  See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and 
the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 9 (2000) 
(discussing the nationwide class action lawsuit Castano v. American Tobacco). 
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litigation,27 there seems to be a societal bias against claims to recover art 
stolen or displaced during the Holocaust.28  This societal bias has been 
vetted openly in recent years, as in the following quote: 
There should now surely be a statute of limitations on this kind of 
restitution.  If we were still in 1950 and the people who owned the 
Manet or the Monet were still alive, then it would surely be correct to 
give these paintings back, but not now and not to grandchildren and 
great-grandchildren.  The world should let go of the past and live in the 
present.29 
Often, Jews seeking recovery of art—their own property—are 
unfairly criticized as being obsessed with money at the expense of the 
museum-going public.30  Public criticism seems to spike after auction of 
a piece of art restituted from a public museum.31  These criticisms reflect 
uninformed, knee-jerk bias divorced from consideration of history or 
law. 
                                                          
 27.  See id. at 2–5 (discussing the “two biggest litigation stories in the United States at the start 
of the twenty-first century,” the Microsoft and tobacco cases). 
 28.  See Alexander Pulte, German Angst Over Return of Kirchner Painting, 9 IFAR J., no. 2, 
2007, at 15 (discussing the anger in Germany over the restitution of a Holocaust-era painting that has 
“generated fear” in those filing restitution claims against German museums for pictures worth 
millions); Tony Paterson & David Cox, German Crisis Meeting Called on Nazi Art Sales, 
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 12, 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 1533955/German-crisis-
meeting-called-on-Nazi-art-sales.html (describing German museum community’s publicly stated 
fears that its heritage is being “spirited away from public view and sold off for millions to private 
collectors” at the expense of the public’s right to view the work). 
 29.  Sir Norman Rosenthal, Editorial, The Time has Come for a Statute of Limitations, ART 
NEWSPAPER (Dec. 11, 2008), www.theartnewspaper.com/article.asp?id=16627; see also Ulrike 
Knöfel, A Question of Morality: An End to Restitution of Nazi Looted Art?, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L 
(Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,618400,00.html (discussing 
Norman Rosenthal’s opposition to restitution); SPIEGEL Interview with British Art Expert: ‘We 
Must Live in the Present,’ SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Apr. 9, 2009), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,618399,00.html (interviewing Norman 
Rosenthal regarding his opposition to the return of art stolen by the Nazis). 
 30.  See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Holocaust, Museum Ethics and Legalism, 18 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 38 (2008) (documenting such criticisms as harkening to stereotypes of 
“greedy” Jews and explaining nonfinancial motivations and symbolic value of restitution of Nazi-
looted art). 
 31.  See Michael Kimmelman, Klimts Go to Market; Museums Hold Their Breath, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 19, 2006, at E1 (discussing the sale of a Klimt painting and stating that “[a] story about justice 
and redemption after the Holocaust has devolved into yet another tale of the crazy, intoxicating art 
market.”); Stevenson Swanson, It’s ‘Our Mona Lisa,’ CHI. TRIB., July 14, 2006, at 1 (discussing the 
world’s most expensive painting, a Klimt portrait once seized by the Nazis, going on display in New 
York). 
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These unfair criticisms have been roundly rejected elsewhere, and 
thus are not the focus of this Article.32  Nonetheless, to quickly dispel the 
notion that such claims cannot be viable under separation of powers 
doctrines,33 it is clear that such claims comport with executive policy, 
which, since the war, has favored restitution.34  Diplomats from the State 
Department played a leading role35 in securing public commitment by the 
forty-four nations that adopted the Washington Conference Principles on 
Nazi-Confiscated Art in December 1998.36  Principles 1 and 2 of the 
Washington Principles respectively state that “[a]rt that had been 
confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted should be 
identified” and “relevant records and archives should be open and 
accessible to researchers, in accordance with the guidelines of the 
International Council on Archives.”37  Additionally, the Terezín 
Declaration, signed by forty-six countries, including the United States, 
emerged from the international conference hosted by the Czech Republic 
in June 2009.38  Under the heading “Nazi-confiscated and Looted Art,” 
the Terezín Declaration states: 
[W]e urge all stakeholders to ensure that their legal systems or 
alternative processes . . . facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to 
Nazi-confiscated and looted art, and to make certain that claims to 
recover such art are resolved expeditiously and based on the facts and 
merits of the claims and all the relevant documents submitted by all 
parties.  Governments should consider all relevant issues when 
applying various legal provisions that may impede the restitution of art 
                                                          
 32.  See Kreder, supra note 30, at 9; Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The New Battleground of Museum 
Ethics and Holocaust-Era Claims: Technicalities Trumping Justice or Responsible Stewardship for 
the Public Trust?, 88 OR. L. REV. 37 (2009). 
 33.  See generally, e.g., John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2011). 
 34.  E.g., U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-186, 112 Stat. 611 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006)) (approved again in 2008 and supporting 
Holocaust-era restitution). 
 35.  See STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND THE 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II 187–204 (2004). 
 36.  Wash. Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, U.S. State Dep’t (Dec. 3, 1998), 
http://www.lootedartcommission.com/Washington-principles (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).  These 
Principles were reaffirmed in Vilnius, Lithuania, in 2000.  Vilnius Forum Declaration, Comm’n for 
Looted Art in Europe (Oct. 5, 2000), http://www.lootedartcommission.com/ vilnius-forum. 
 37.  Wash. Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, supra note 36, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 38.  Terezín Declaration Holocaust Era Assets Conference (June 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.holocausteraassets.eu/program/conference-proceedings/ 
declarations/ (follow “TEREZIN_DECLARATION_FINAL.PDF (78,2kB)” hyperlink). 
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and cultural property, in order to achieve just and fair solutions, as well 
as alternative dispute resolution, where appropriate under law.39 
These recent declarations call for effective, fair, fact-based resolution 
of Nazi-looted art claims.  Judicial attentiveness to what happened 
seventy to eighty years ago would augment current executive efforts to 
resolve the unfinished business of World War II and guard against 
assaults upon truth and memory.40 
The Washington Principles were sparked in part by guidelines issued 
by the Association of American Museum Directors (AAMD) in June 
1998.41  Thus, it is shocking that U.S. museums, often as plaintiffs, assert 
statute of limitations and laches defenses, in contempt of the Washington 
Principles, distorting the historical record and law in the process.42  
Museums that have filed declaratory judgments on technical grounds 
against claimants include the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, Detroit 
Institute of Arts, Toledo Museum of Art, and the Guggenheim.43  The 
Norton Simon Museum of Art and MoMA have also raised technical 
defenses in response to claims.44 
Moreover, the valuation of the art that deserves to be restituted to its 
true owners is far from trivial.  The injustice of denying restitution is 
tremendous, not just in symbolic terms. 
According to Ronald Lauder [in 1998], a former U.S. ambassador to 
Austria and now chairman of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, 
‘more than 100,000 pieces of art, worth at least $10 billion in total, are 
still missing from the Nazi era.’  Mr. Lauder believes that ‘because of 
                                                          
 39.  Id. at 4, ¶ 3. 
 40.  See DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON 
TRUTH AND MEMORY 19 (1993) (“These attacks on history and knowledge have the potential to alter 
dramatically the way established truth is transmitted from generation to generation.”). 
 41.  Position Papers & Reports, Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., Report of the AAMD Task Force 
on the Spoliation of Art During the Nazi/World War II Era (1933–1934) (June 4, 1998), 
http://www.aamd.org/papers/guideln.php [hereinafter AAMD Guidelines] (“AAMD has developed 
the following guidelines to assist museums in resolving claims, reconciling the interests of 
individuals who were dispossessed of works of art or their heirs together with the fiduciary and legal 
obligations and responsibilities of art museums and their trustees to the public for whom they hold 
works of art in trust.”); see also PETER HARCLERODE & BRENDAN PITTAWAY, THE LOST MASTERS: 
WORLD WAR II AND THE LOOTING OF EUROPE’S TREASUREHOUSES 229 (2000) (describing passage 
of the AAMD guidelines). 
 42.  Kreder, supra note 32, at 82–83. 
 43.  Id. at 64, 66, 72. 
 44.  See App. A, nos. 2, 4. 
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these large numbers, every institution, art museum and private 
collection has some of these missing works.’45 
These numbers are grounded in historical data interpreted in 1998.46  
There is now reason to believe the amount of Nazi-looted art trafficked 
into the United States exceeds previous estimates.47 
This Article demonstrates how judges should treat Holocaust-era art 
claims, and how they should reject the recent trend of dismissals.  This 
trend seems to indicate that bias has infected our courts.48  In recent 
years, collectors and museums—treasure houses of high culture and art, 
and some of the most venerated institutions in the United States—have 
persuaded federal judges to dismiss complex Holocaust-era art cases 
without addressing the merits.49  This has prevented fact-finding in these 
cases, contravening executive policy and museums’ own ethics 
guidelines.  Moreover, as depicted in the chart entitled Federal 
Holocaust-Era Art Claims Since 2004 attached to this Article, some 
judges seem to presume that claims seventy years old cannot be viable.50 
For example, in Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, a district court judge 
held that the statute of limitations ran in 194351—before the Allies had 
landed on the beaches of Normandy, let alone defeated the Wehrmacht 
and liberated survivors in death and work camps.  The Ullin court 
applied Ohio law, finding that if the owner of the painting believed that 
its sale was wrongful, she could have sought recovery of the painting 
within the Ohio statute of limitations by 1943.52  The court considered 
the owner’s failure to pursue her claim to be evidence that she did not 
believe the sale of that painting was wrongful.53  The court also noted 
                                                          
 45.  Marilyn E. Phelan, Scope of Due Diligence Investigation in Obtaining Title to Valuable 
Artwork, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 631, 660 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 46.  Id. at 659 n.145. 
 47.  See infra Part III.C. 
 48.  See infra Part IV. 
 49.  See infra notes 158–358 and accompanying text. 
 50.  See App. A (outlining cases lost by Holocaust victims or their heirs); see also infra Part IV. 
 51.  477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (holding contrary to Ohio’s use of the demand 
and refusal principle, which accords with the majority of U.S. jurisdictions).  Contra Houser v. Ohio 
Historical Soc’y, 380 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (discussing that special circumstances 
can delay the presumption that demand was made within the time period of the statute of 
limitations). 
 52.  Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 807–08. 
 53.  Id. at 807. 
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that the Ohio statute of limitations, unlike other states’, did not contain 
an exception for Nazi-era art cases.54 
In fact, so many courts seem to have subjected Nazi-era art cases to a 
presumption of invalidity that, since the landmark case of Republic of 
Austria v. Altmann55 in 2004, only one claimant has successfully 
recovered Nazi-looted art in federal court.56  In Altmann, Maria Altmann, 
a then-octogenarian Holocaust survivor, prevailed against the claim of a 
foreign government that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over a foreign 
sovereign that possesses Nazi-looted art.57  The Supreme Court held that 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA),58 the sole means to 
acquire jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in the courts of the United 
States, authorized a Holocaust victim to sue the Republic of Austria for 
failing to return art to her as the sole survivor of her uncle, who was 
forced to flee Vienna after the 1938 Anschluss of Austria59—long before 
the passage of the FSIA.  The Supreme Court ruled that because the 
expropriation was illegal when it occurred, the statutory expropriation 
exception abridged the blanket immunity that normally would have 
insulated the Republic of Austria from suit in the United States.60  
Altmann was able to recover her property only after Austria offered to 
arbitrate the dispute in Vienna; the republic fought Altmann furiously but 
lost nonetheless.61 
Almost incredibly, Altmann was subsequently criticized in such 
prominent newspapers as the New York Times for getting back her own 
                                                          
 54.  Id. at 806. 
 55.  541 U.S. 677, 733 (2004) (ruling that the Republic of Austria could be sued in the United 
States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for conduct that predated passage of the Act).  
The Act of State Doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally Lucy Dunn Schwallie, 
Note, Acts of Theft and Concealment: Arguments Against the Application of the Act of State 
Doctrine in Cases of Nazi-looted Art, 11 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 281, 285 (2006) 
(discussing the Act of State Doctrine and determining that it is inapplicable where treaties and public 
policy demand the looted property’s return). 
 56.  See Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008) (the one successful case). 
 57.  Altmann, 541 U.S. at 697–702. 
 58.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 59.  A rough translation of Anschluss is “annexation.”  See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 
55 (William Morris, ed., New College ed. 1976) (defining Anschluss as the political union of Nazi 
Germany and Austria).  See generally ALFRED D. LOW, THE ANSCHLUSS MOVEMENT, 1931–38, AND 
THE GREAT POWERS (1985) (explaining in detail the Anschluss Movement). 
 60.  Altmann, 541 U.S. at 706–08 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 61.  William Grimes, Maria Altmann, Pursuer of Family’s Stolen Paintings, Dies at 94, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/arts/design/09altmann.html?_r=1 (Altmann 
“then submitted the case to binding arbitration in Austria” and “[i]n January 2006 the panel awarded 
[her] ownership of the five paintings.”). 
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property.62  This occurred despite the Republic of Austria forcing her 
family to make donations of some of the most valuable artwork in the 
world63 to secure any recovery of their significant assets after the war.64  
People lamented the public’s loss of the “Austrian Mona Lisa”65—
despite the fact that the painting is now on display in the Neue Gallery in 
New York.66 
Since Altmann, federal courts have rejected the restitution claims in 
Nazi-looted art cases on procedural grounds, such as state statutes of 
limitations and the affirmative defense of laches, except in one case 
presenting egregious facts.67  These cases were wrongly decided without 
the benefits of expert historians and understanding of the decisional law 
in this specialized area,68 the lack of which hinders victims of the 
Holocaust and their heirs from reclaiming their property located within 
the United States.  Depriving Jewish claimants of full and fair hearings 
of these property and inheritance claims in federal courts—the usual 
venue for diversity suits of this sort—violates the equality inherent in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.69  In contrast, an unknown 
                                                          
 62.  See Kimmelman, supra note 31 (“How refreshing this story would have been had the 
Bloch-Bauers conceived a way to ensure that the birch landscape, say, ended up in public hands.”). 
 63.  Carol Vogel, Lauder Pays $135 Million, a Record, for a Klimt Portrait, N.Y. TIMES, June 
19, 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/06/19/arts/desgin/19klim.html. 
 64.  Altmann, 541 U.S. at 683 (majority opinion); Gerald D. Feldman, Reflections on the 
Restitution and Compensation of Holocaust Theft: Past, Present, and Future, in ROBBERY AND 
RESTITUTION: THE CONFLICT OVER JEWISH PROPERTY IN EUROPE 263 (Martin Dean, et al., eds., 
2007) (“Austria . . . was not only allowed but also encouraged by the Allies to consider itself the 
‘first victim’ of National Socialist German expansion, and could thus, at least until recently, evade 
responsibility for its own role in Nazi crimes, including the spoliation of the Jews.”); see also 
RICHARD Z. CHESNOFF, PACK OF THIEVES: HOW HITLER AND EUROPE PLUNDERED THE JEWS AND 
COMMITTED THE GREATEST THEFT IN HISTORY 23–43 (1999) (discussing the Austrian government’s 
appropriation of Jewish assets following its annexation of Nazi Germany). 
 65.  Kimmelman, supra note 31.  The author does not intend to imply in any fashion that 
subsequent public display is relevant to whether Holocaust survivors or their heirs seeking their own 
property deserve criticism for seeking restitution or for what they do with the property after 
restitution.  I believe they do not. 
 66.  E.g., Calev Ben-David, A Priceless Piece of Artistic Justice, JERUSALEM POST, June 30, 
2006, at 12. 
 67.  See Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 56–59 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding the district 
court’s rejection of laches defense and order of replevin). 
 68.  E.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 143–47 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining why 
Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), was wrongly decided, 
namely because the possessor has the burden of proving that a painting is not stolen property). 
 69.  See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“[D]iscrimination may be so 
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”).  Cf. Neithamer v. Brenneman Prop. Servs., Inc., 81 
F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1999) (“[D]ismissing a case summary judgment because a plaintiff cannot 
prove a defendant’s suspicions would subject HIV-positive individuals to the very discrimination 
that Congress sought to prevent, by denying them a remedy even when such discrimination 
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number of Nazi-era art cases settle out of court in accordance with the 
Washington Principles.70  The litigated cases reflect either a categorical 
refusal to permit fact-finding or, worse, a de facto presumption that 
survivors’ and heirs’ claims to Nazi-looted art are invalid.  The more 
complex a case, the more attentive courts must be to details; but, a 
bedrock principle of the judicial system demands that courts afford all 
litigants an even-handed administration of justice. 
III. NAZI AND WORLD WAR II HISTORY: THE KEY TO ASSESSING THE 
PLAUSIBILITY OF ART CLAIMS 
In one of the most recently filed appeals of a dismissed Holocaust-
era art case, the district court characterized the dispute as “a legal, not a 
historical, question.”71  This statement evinces a false dichotomy of the 
judicial function—judges readily look to history to interpret law, perhaps 
most notably the Constitution,72 because “[t]he linkage between past and 
present is especially central in law.”73  Judges cannot be expected to 
know intimately the historical context of all cases that come before them, 
                                                                                                                       
 
existed.”). 
 70.  See Thomas R. Kline, Portrait of Notoriety, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2010, 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703294904575385543744550822.html (“Quietly . . . 
many [Nazi-looted art] cases are settled with little public notice.”). 
 71.  Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 403 F. 
App’x 575 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 102 (2011). 
 72.  See Amy Kapczynski, Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1042 (2005) (“[W]e must think historically if we want to think 
constitutionally . . . .”); see also G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional 
Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002) (analyzing the historical turn in constitutional scholarship).  
Others give lesser import to historical underpinnings in interpreting the Constitution, but virtually no 
one suggests it is irrelevant.  See Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, 
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1249–50 (1997) (“Lawyers and judges faced 
with a contemporary constitutional issue must try to construct a coherent, principled, and persuasive 
interpretation of the text of particular clauses, the structure of the Constitution as a whole, and our 
history under the Constitution . . . .”); Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1519, 1519 (1997) (“Constitutional meaning . . . emerges in the course of the struggle by 
ordinary Americans to hammer out fundamental political understandings . . . ., fueled by . . . crucial 
historical events . . . .”).  Others advocate different methods for interpreting the Constitution, 
including what could be termed “broad originalism.”  See Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in 
Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 528 (1995) (“The rediscovery of 
America’s formative constitutional traditions promises a wealth of historical insights closer to home 
for any theorist inclined to look at the past.”).  See generally William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995) 
(analyzing constitutional issues in a historical context). 
 73.  Daniel A. Farber, Adjudication of Things Past: Reflections on History as Evidence, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1030 (1998). 
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but they should not ignore widely accepted historical facts when deciding 
the plausibility that a seemingly voluntary transaction was, in fact, made 
under duress.74 
Judges even have the power to take judicial notice of widely known 
historical facts.75  As discussed below, as to factual allegations that are 
less readily understandable, judges should welcome historians into the 
courthouse to explain whether more-nuanced interpretations of facts are 
actually plausible.76  Because the Nazis used many tactics to mask 
involuntary transactions in a cloak of legality, documentation of such 
transactions should be viewed with a cynical, historically informed eye.77 
From their very first days in power in 1933, the Nazis forced Jews to 
abandon their property in order to flee.78  As a matter of law, fleeing 
Jews cannot be deemed to have abandoned their property.79  The Jews’ 
loss of their property as they fled “for their lives was no more voluntary 
than the relinquishment of property during a holdup.”80 
Moreover, as laid bare below, the historical record leaves no serious 
doubt that, both during and immediately after the war, art insiders were 
                                                          
 74.  Cf., e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860–65 (1992) (engaging 
in extensive analysis of history to uphold Roe v. Wade); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 
122–23 (1989) (holding that liberty interests protected by Due Process Clause are fundamental only 
if “rooted in history and tradition”). 
 75.  Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 804 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (“In 
considering a motion to dismiss the Court may consider ‘materials in addition to the complaint if 
such materials are public records or are otherwise appropriate for the taking of judicial notice.’” 
(quoting New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 336 F.3d 495, 501 
(6th Cir. 2003))). 
 76.  See infra Part IV. 
 77.  See infra Part IV. 
 78.  RAUL HILBURG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 640–41 (2003) (“When in the 
early days of 1933 the first civil servant wrote the first definition of ‘non-Aryan’ into a civil service 
ordinance, the fate of European Jewry was sealed.”). 
 79.  See Restitution of Identifiable Property; Law No. 59, 12 Fed. Reg. 7983, § 3.75 (Nov. 29, 
1947) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 2100), [hereinafter “Military Government Law 59”] (ordering 
“speedy restitution of identifiable property . . . to persons who were wrongfully deprived of such 
property within the period from January 30, 1933 to May 8, 1945 . . . .”); Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 
136, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Grunbaum never voluntarily intended to pass title to the Drawing.  On the 
contrary, the circumstances strongly suggest that he executed the power of attorney with a gun to his 
head.”); Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300, 307 (D.R.I. 2007), aff’d, 548 F.3d 50, 53 (1st 
Cir. 2008) (describing how the victim “surrendered to the inevitable” and fled Germany without ever 
being able to recover the below market value proceeds from an auction of his painting); Menzel v. 
List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that no abandonment occurred and that 
“[t]he relinquishment here by the Menzels in order to flee for their lives was no more voluntary than 
the relinquishment of property during a holdup . . . .”). 
 80.  Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 810. 
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aware of81 the influx of flight-art starting in 1933 and of the Nazi practice 
of spoliation of Jewish treasures and “degenerate” art.82  Hitler, the failed 
artist, sought to eliminate Jewish culture from the Third Reich, including 
modern art, which he deemed to be degenerate.83  The Nazis maintained 
“that Jews had intentionally duped the German people into embracing 
nontraditional aesthetic styles” and “that they had promoted modern art 
as a ploy to reap huge profits.”84 
The Nazi regime’s incentive to obtain the fine art of Jewish 
collectors was, in part, to liquidate it to fund the government.85  
Additionally, many Nazi leaders were fine art “collectors” and thieves 
and desired to obtain such pieces for the prestige that was associated with 
them—even though many paintings and objects had been deemed by the 
government to be degenerate art.86  In the Nazi government’s attempt to 
acquire this art, it used meticulous documentation and falsification of 
documents to conceal the forced nature of the transactions.87  This false 
documentation can hinder present day claims of art theft because it gives 
the transactions the superficial appearance of legitimacy.88  Additionally, 
many Jewish families surrendered their valuables under duress to the 
Nazis to avoid being taken to concentration camps.89 
On July 5, 1940, the Nazis established the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter 
Rosenberg (ERR) to track down works of art owned by Jewish people, 
seize the property, and transfer it to Germany.90  To maintain the 
appearance of legality, the purported goal of this body was to safeguard 
the works.91  The Nazi government also declared some art works to be 
degenerate and contrary to the German ideology.  The Committee for the 
Assessment of Inferior Works of Art identified and destroyed 
                                                          
 81.  See infra Part III.B. 
 82.   MICHAEL J. KURTZ, AMERICA AND THE RETURN OF NAZI CONTRABAND 31 (2006); see 
also Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 201(4), 112 Stat. 15, 17 (1998) (“The 
Nazis’ policy of looting art was a critical element and incentive in their campaign of genocide 
against individuals of Jewish and other religious and cultural heritage . . . .”); NORMAN PALMER, 
MUSEUMS AND THE HOLOCAUST 8 (2000). 
 83.  See KURTZ, supra note 82, at 31. 
 84.  JONATHAN PETROPOULOS, ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH 54 (1999). 
 85.  See PALMER, supra note 82, at 3. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 3–4. 
 88.  See id. at 4. (“This obsession with paper work and legal nicety (particularly the fabrication 
of voluntary transactions) can hamper the tracing of works . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 89.  Id. at 59. 
 90.  Id. at 7. 
 91.  Id. 
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approximately 5,000 of these art works.92  Much more degenerate art was 
seized and sold to generate income for the Nazi government.93  The 
looting of art was widespread and included German museums and art 
held by private owners outside of Germany.94  It is estimated that the 
Nazis looted over three million art objects from occupied countries.95 
Immediately after World War II, the Nuremberg Tribunal evaluated 
detailed evidence of coerced sales of art, and the plunder of art was 
declared a war crime.96  At Nuremberg, it was perfectly clear to the fact 
finders who had done what and to whom.97  Shortly thereafter, in Bonn 
and Vienna, it was equally clear that to rejoin the human family, 
Germany and Austria had to repudiate all spurious “transactions” of the 
entire Nazi era, including art deals that were actually seizures.98  It is 
distressing that in a federal courtroom today what used to be as clear as 
day has now become as obscure as the “night and fog.”99 
We must ensure that our federal courts do not endorse distortions of 
the historical record by granting motions to dismiss claims on statute of 
limitations and laches grounds, which impliedly accept that today’s 
claimants are at fault for not demanding their property back from some 
of the nations’ most powerful institutions.  This is necessary even though 
the key to the claims—information—was inaccessible during the Cold 
War and, too commonly, remains locked away to this day, often by 
individuals and institutions right here in the United States.100 
                                                          
 92.  Id. at 7–8. 
 93.  Id. at 8. 
 94.  Id. at 9. 
 95.  Id. at 11 (quoting CHESNOFF, supra note 64, at 38). 
 96.  Wilfried Fiedler, Legal Issues Bearing on the Restitution of German Cultural Property in 
Russia, in THE SPOILS OF WAR 178 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997) (“The Nazi War criminals were 
accused of ‘pillage and destruction’ of works of art, including both private and public property . . . . 
The judgment of the Nuremberg trials stated: ‘. . . that it was supported by evidence that the 
territories occupied by Germany had been exploited in the most merciless way and that actually a 
systematic plundering of public and private property had taken place.’”) 
 97.  For example, Alfred Rosenberg, head of the infamous ERR art looting unit, was convicted 
and sentenced to death by hanging.  Charter of the Int’l Military Tribunal, Alfred Rosenberg, (Aug. 
8, 1945), http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/NurembergIndictments.html# 
Rosenberg (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). 
 98.  E.g., Military Government Law 59, supra note 79 (ordering return of identifiable property 
to persons who were deprived of it between January 30, 1933 and May 8, 1945). 
 99.  See Benjamin E. Pollock, Out of the Night and Fog: Permitting Litigation to Prompt an 
International Resolution to Nazi-looted Art Claims, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 193, 195 (2006) (arguing that 
claims concerning Nazi-looted art should be heard in U.S. courts). 
 100.  See Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481–89 (S.D.N.Y.) (discussing 
MoMA’s refusal to provide access to provenance documents despite public statements to the 
contrary), aff’d, 403 F. App’x 575 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 102 (2011); see also infra 
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In 1998, MoMA director Glenn Lowry acknowledged in 
congressional testimony the “rapacity of the Nazis and their 
collaborators,” estimating that the Nazis stole “[t]ens of thousands” of 
pieces of art.101  Lowry and other high-profile museum directors swore in 
Congress that they would conduct research and devise a system to 
remedy this great injustice.102 
Another historian has stated: “The paintings came to America 
because for more than 10 years during and after the war there was no 
place else to sell them . . . .”103  Yet, since the 1998 promises in 
Washington and Terezín to open up archives, make them searchable, 
help claimants discover their property, and resolve claims fairly and 
equitably, fewer than forty paintings have been restituted by U.S. 
museums.104  More cash settlements have been made, usually quietly.105  
Some museums have put forth a good faith effort to conduct and 
publicize provenance research needed to identify art displaced during the 
Holocaust;106 other museums hide behind the expense of performing 
                                                                                                                       
 
Part IV.B. 
 101.  Press Release, Comm. on Fin. Servs., Testimony Before the House Banking & Fin. Servs. 
Comm. by Glenn D. Lowry, Director, The Museum of Modern Art, N.Y. (Feb. 12, 1998), 
http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/banking/21298low.shtml. 
 102.  Walter V. Robinson, Museums’ Stance on Nazi Loot Belies Their Role in a Key Case, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1998, at A1. 
 103.  Adam Zagorin, Saving the Spoils of War, TIME, Dec. 1, 1997, at 87 (quoting Willi Korte, 
consultant on Holocaust losses to the Senate Banking Committee); see also Lucille A. Roussin, 
Holocaust-Era Looted Art: The Routes Into the U.S., 5 IFAR J., no.3, 2002, at 36. 
The market remained rationed until at least 1951.  In the previous years heavy price rises 
could only be sustained by purely native or resident buyers in such protected areas as the 
U.S.A.  In the early fifties it was still said that the cheapest thing you could buy was a 
work of art . . . . Nor were the prices of the later fifties, particularly the prices of 
nineteenth and twentieth-century French art, altogether the ‘coup de foudre’ which the 
popular Press made them to be. 
Id. (quoting GERALD REITLINGER, THE ECONOMICS OF TASTE 220 (1961)).  Professor Roussin has 
documented the importation process and how looted paintings entered the United States without 
investigation, including a shipment by the Galerie Fischer in Lucerne, Switzerland, which was 
known to have dealt with the Nazis.  See id. at 39. 
 104.  See Mark Stryker, The Art of the Matter: The DIA and Toledo Museum of Art Could Lose a 
Van Gogh and a Gauguin Worth Millions in a Dispute with the Heirs of a Woman Who Sold the 
Works in the Nazi Era. But was she Pressured to Settle for Less?, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 19, 
2006, at L1 (“There have been about 30 claims made on U.S. museums for Nazi-looted art in the last 
decade, a dozen of which resulted in the pieces being returned or in restitution, according to the 
American Association of Museums.  Most cases are resolved through quiet compromise.  Arbitration 
panels are becoming standard in Europe but haven’t caught on in the United States.”). 
 105.  See Kline, supra note 70 (“Quietly, however, many cases are settled with little public 
notice.”). 
 106.  E.g., Celestine Bohlen, National Gallery to Return a Family’s Painting Looted by the 
Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at E1 (reporting that Frans Snyders’ stolen painting “Still Life 
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provenance research as an excuse not to do it.107  This excuse 
undoubtedly will gain more traction in the current economic climate. 
Despite such excuses, some museums have managed to reach deep 
into their pockets to initiate costly litigation to shut down claims before 
allowing claimants to research their archives.  This action blatantly 
contradicts promises museums made to Congress.  And in the case of the 
MoMA, in blatant contradiction to its own website, which states that its 
archives “serve[] outside researchers as well as Museum staff.”108 
The conclusion that there is almost no looted art in our institutions 
simply is not plausible.  Without discovery of the documents necessary 
to fill in the gaps in the historical record, claims cannot succeed and our 
courts help distort truth and memory.  The following is a brief rendition 
of the key historical facts we do know, which should inform judicial 
decision-making in the field. 
A. Inside the Reich 
Judges faced with Nazi-era art claims should fully consider the 
historical reality of the Nazi era in Europe.  The National Socialist 
platform, adopted as official German state policy in 1933, was 
committed to driving Jews and other “enemies of the State” out of 
economic life.109  The Führerprinzip110 demanded unquestioning loyalty 
to the concentrated power of a unitary executive.111  Both legislators and 
judges in Nazi Germany helped to normalize practices of state grand 
theft that were engineered to make involuntary transactions appear 
                                                                                                                       
 
with Fruit and Game” was donated to the National Gallery of Art in 1990, but through curator Nancy 
Yeide’s extensive research effort, the gallery decided to return the painting in November of 2000). 
 107.  See Earl A. Powell, III, Director, Nat’l Gallery of Art, Address to the Plenary Session on 
Nazi-Confiscated Art Issues at the Wash. Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets, 470 (Dec. 1, 1998), 
fcit.usf.edu/holocaust/resource/assets/heac4.pdf (explaining that provenance research is a “time 
consuming, expensive kind of research.”). 
 108.  About the Archives, MOMA, http://www.moma.org/learn/resources/archives/archives_ 
about (last visited Aug. 28, 2012). 
 109.  See, e.g., MARTIN DEAN, ROBBING THE JEWS: THE CONFISCATION OF JEWISH PROPERTY IN 
THE HOLOCAUST, 1933-1945, at 25 (2008); INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE 
THIRD REICH 115–19 (1991). 
 110.  DAVID WELCH, THE THIRD REICH: POLITICS AND PROPAGANDA 107 (2d ed. 2002) 
(describing Führerprinzip as a mystical notion of a leader guiding the nation’s destiny, resulting in 
commands coming from a centralized leader rather than choices made by the people). 
 111.  FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP: A STUDY IN SOCIAL PATHOLOGY AND 
THE POLITICS OF FASCISM 120–24 (1972). 
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“ordinary and legal” from the very first weeks of the Nazi regime;112 this 
was before the infamous racist Nuremberg laws of “blood and honor” in 
1935 and the push to a “Final Solution.”  As later observed by the U.S. 
Consul General in Vienna immediately after the Anschluss of Austria in 
March 1938: “There is a curious respect for legal formalities.  The 
signature of the person despoiled is always obtained, even if the person 
in question has to be sent to Dachau in order to break down his 
resistance.”113  Thus, theft of Jewish-owned art usually was disguised by 
the appearance of legality. 
Quite problematic in the context of distinguishing voluntary from 
involuntary transactions was the application of the Flight Tax.  The 
Flight Tax preexisted the Nazis’ rise to power but was turned to evil ends 
to persecute Jews even as they were trying to flee, and the extortion was 
especially compounded by the blocking of Jews’ bank accounts starting 
in 1940.114  The Flight Tax confiscated much of a fleeing Jewish family’s 
wealth, which gave rise to the dilemma of whether a Jewish family 
should give up all its property for a chance of escape or remain in 
Germany with the hope that the restrictions would dissipate with time.115  
Beginning in 1940, the Nazis also blocked all payments into Jewish bank 
                                                          
 112.   Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 138 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Lawyers were everywhere and 
their influence was pervasive.  Again and again, there was a need for legal justifications.” (quoting 
RAUL HILBERG, PERPETRATORS VICTIMS BYSTANDERS: THE JEWISH CATASTROPHE, 1933-1945, at 
71 (1992))).  The Bakalar court also cited the following sources with approval: CHESNOFF, supra 
note 64, at 33–35 (“To give some legal fiction to its theft of Jewish property, the Nazis had 
promulgated a ‘Law for the Compensation of Damages Caused to the German Reich by Jews.’”); 
Henry Friedlander, Nazi Crimes and the German Law, in NAZI CRIMES AND THE LAW 16–17 
(Nathan Stolzfus & Henry Friedlander, eds., 2008) (explaining widespread nature of the respect for 
legal formalities within the Reich); RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, NAZI JUSTIZ: LAW OF THE 
HOLOCAUST 1 (1995) (“[O]bedience to legal forms strengthened [the Reich’s] power.  Upstanding 
citizens felt a moral obligation to submit to the law’s authority . . . . Resistance was immoral.  If any 
citizens felt unease about a particular policy, their pained consciences were salved via display of a 
suitably stamped document in pursuance to a decree.”); Peter Hayes, Summary and Conclusions, in 
CONFISCATION OF JEWISH PROPERTY IN EUROPE, 1933-1945: NEW SOURCES AND PERSPECTIVES 
143, 147 (2003) (The law “removed the question of the morality or legitimacy of the process.”). 
 113.  WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE NIGHTMARE YEARS, 1930-1940, at 30 (1992). 
 114.  ESTHER TISA FRANCINI, ET AL., INDEP. EXPERT COMM’N SWITZ.-WWII FLIGHT GOODS—
STOLEN GOODS: THE TRANSFER OF CULTURAL ASSETS IN AND VIA SWITZERLAND 1933-1945 AND 
THE QUESTION OF RESTITUTION 319 (2001) (providing example of woman committing suicide 
because she could not emigrate due to the “Reich Escape Tax.”) (translation on file with the Kansas 
Law Review).  See generally HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO 
STEAL THE WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF ART 155–64 (1997) (detailing how Nazi authorities 
traded or sold numerous works of art to Swiss traders in the early 1940s). 
 115.  GERALD D. FELDMAN, CONFISCATION OF JEWISH ASSETS, AND THE HOLOCAUST 4 (2003) 
(“The Reich ‘Flight Tax,’ for example, was created by the Brüning regime in 1931 to prevent capital 
flight from Germany; it did so by forcing emigrants to pay twenty-five percent of their assets.”). 
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accounts and placed harsh restrictions on how much money Jews could 
withdraw from their own accounts.116 
From the very beginning of the Nazi era, law and jurisprudence were 
strong components of the justification of regulations that deprived 
enemies of the state117 of their liberty and property; deprivations led to 
mass murder.118  Indeed, the legalized grand larceny helped to finance 
the mass murder.119  It is crucial for judges today to understand that Jews 
were systematically excluded from professions and forced to compile 
inventories to streamline the despoliation of their property from 1933 to 
1942, when Jews had little or no property left to rob, and when the 
Nazis’ focus turned to cost-efficient mass murder in the death camps of 
occupied Poland.120 
It distorts historical reality to suggest that the financial despair of 
Jews in 1933, during widespread, sporadic boycotts, until the passage of 
the first Nuremberg law in 1935 was the result of a series of isolated 
private setbacks brought about by generalized severe financial conditions 
akin to the Great Depression.121 
After the seizure of power in early 1933, the effects of a series of 
boycotts, discriminatory treatment, and specific legal measures rapidly 
undermined the position of Jewish business, employees, and 
professionals.  Jews were not only excluded from government service, 
                                                          
 116.  Id. 
 117.  CHESNOFF, supra note 64, at 8 (“For Adolf Hitler and his most willing executioners, Jews 
were a cancer on society, a malignancy that had to be surgically but brutally excised with no 
anesthesia: The Jews of the world, declared Hitler, are ‘vermin.’”). 
 118.  See, e.g., MÜLLER, supra note 109, at 21 (“[T]he courts persisted in their refusal to 
recognize the violent character of the National Socialist Movement.”). 
 119.  See DEAN, supra note 109, at 2 (explaining the Nazis’ “application of pseudo-legal and 
bureaucratic methods is also the defining characteristic of the confiscation of Jewish property.”); see 
also GÖTZ ALY, HITLER’S BENEFICIARIES: PLUNDER, RACIAL WAR, AND THE NAZI WELFARE STATE 
6 (2007) (explaining that public enthusiasm for anti-Semitic policy “can generally be observed 
whenever a part of society claims the right to rationalize other people’s property.”); DAVID 
CESARANI, BECOMING EICHMANN: RETHINKING THE LIFE, CRIMES, AND TRIAL OF A “DESK 
MURDERER” 67 (2004) (detailing Eichmann’s bureaucratic policies to seize money and property 
from emigrating Jews); RICHARD J. EVANS, THE THIRD REICH IN POWER 1933-1939, at 392 (2005) 
(“Aryanization did indeed offer many opportunities to non-Jewish businesses and businessmen to 
enrich themselves.”). 
 120.  See DEAN, supra note 109, at 379 (“[L]aws excluding [Jews] from the civil service and 
other professions . . . steadily drove the Jews out of the German economy.”). 
 121.  See AVRAHAM BARKAI, FROM BOYCOTT TO ANNIHILATION: THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE OF 
GERMAN JEWS 1933-1943, at 5–6 (1989) (explaining “Jews had been harder hit by the postwar 
economic crisis” and “[t]he anti-Semitic boycott had already begun . . . and was intensified 
particularly during the 1929–1932 Depression”); EVANS, supra note 119, at 544 (detailing how the 
Nuremberg laws reduced Jews to “subjects of the state”); see also infra notes 267–313. 
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but state and Nazi Party initiatives progressively drove them out of 
many other trades and professions.  Large numbers of Jews emigrated 
or ran into economic difficulties, so that more than half of all Jewish 
businesses were sold or liquidated by the summer of 1938.122 
In 1935, James McDonald resigned on moral grounds from his post 
as High Commissioner for Refugees.123  McDonald detailed the 
economic devastation of German Jews and noted that many wanted to 
flee but could not because of financial predation occurring between 1933 
and 1935.124  High Commissioner McDonald’s resignation was reprinted 
in the New York Times,125 which begs the next issue: Did purchasers and 
recipients of donations of art know where it came from—and what could 
survivors or their heirs do about it? 
B. Knowledge of Spoliation Outside the Reich Highly Relevant to Good 
Faith Purchaser Status Under Foreign Law, Statutes of Limitation, 
Laches Defenses, and Equitable Tolling 
Some American museums uphold that the art world was oblivious to 
the infection of the market until 1998, but the story of the Nazis stealing 
more art than any regime in history, surpassing even Napoleon, was 
widely told—even front page news.126  Theodore Rousseau, a former 
officer of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) who became a curator of 
paintings at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, thought it was “absurd” for 
American museums to miss out on the fire sales: “[I]t’s absurd to let the 
Germans have the paintings the Nazi bigwigs got, often through forced 
sales, from all over Europe.  Some of them ought to come here [to 
American museums].”127  In fairness, this quotation seems to refer solely 
                                                          
 122.  EVANS, supra note 119, at 18. 
 123.  Text of Resignation of League Commissioner for German Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
1935. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See, e.g., Milton Esterow, Europe Is Still Hunting Its Plundered Art: Hundreds of Millions 
in Treasures Elude Postwar Search, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1964, at 1 (reporting many countries were 
seeking art looted mostly by Nazis during World War II); Francis Henry Taylor, Europe’s Looted 
Art: Can it be Recovered?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1943, at SM18 (“Not since the time of Napolean 
Bonaparte has there been the wholesale looting and destruction of art property that is going on today 
in the occupied countries”); Otto D. Tolischus, Hitler will Seize Property of Foes, N.Y. TIMES, July 
15, 1933, at 1 (announcing Hitler adopted decrees providing for confiscation of all property 
belonging to those hostile to the regime). 
 127.  LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE 
THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 438–39 (1994). 
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to the Nazis’ liquidation of degenerate art from Germany’s own 
museums.128 
As early as 1933, the New York Times published articles 
documenting Nazi seizures of property written by critics of the Nazi 
regime.129  The Times decried: “To Be a Jew Is Held a Crime.”130  As of 
January 1, 1936, Professor Karl Loewenstein wrote for the Yale Law 
Journal: 
Jews are finally driven out even from the remaining nooks and crannies 
of economic life by the official economic boycott, more or less 
endorsed by the courts.  Obligations of contract, vested rights, the right 
to dispose freely of property, were superseded by political coordination.  
Legal titles were voided and property confiscated under the pressure of 
party members and officials.131 
Judges in New York understood these facts as early as 1936.132 
In a 1938 letter to a Guggenheim Foundation curator, the famous 
artist Otto Nebel described the Nazis’ plans to liquidate degenerate art: 
“[T]he entire German museum collections in modern art are 
involved! . . . I believe that one shouldn’t help transform works of art 
into armaments—and that, after all, would be the end result.  But that is 
my own opinion, and it needn’t bother anyone.”133  Francis Henry Taylor, 
former Director of MoMA, also condemned Nazi-looted art trafficking in 
the New York Times in 1943.134 
In 1943, the United States joined all Allied powers in issuing the 
Declaration Regarding Forced Transfers of Property in Enemy-
Controlled Territory, also known as the “London Declaration,” warning 
art buyers that the Nazis were using false paperwork to fabricate 
provenances.135  Two years later, the Roberts Commission, chaired by 
                                                          
 128.  See id. at 438 (quoting a telegram from the Acting Secretary of State Lovett who addressed 
Theodore Rousseau as the American museum official who was “openly advocating the sale of 
objects from Nazi and German public collections.”). 
 129.  Tolischus, supra note 126, at 1. 
 130.  German Fugitives Tell of Atrocities at Hands of Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1933, at 5. 
 131.  Karl Loewenstein, Law in the Third Reich, 45 YALE L.J. 779, 797, 807 (1936). 
 132.  See Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 290 N.Y.S. 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936), 
aff’d, 299 N.Y.S. 748 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937), aff’d in part, modified in part, 14 N.E.2d 798 (N.Y. 
1938). 
 133.  JOAN M. LUKACH, HILLA REBAY: IN SEARCH OF THE SPIRIT IN ART 121 (George Braziller, 
ed., 1983). 
 134.  See Taylor, supra note 126, at SM18 (supporting the formulation of an American 
Commission to deal with Nazi-looted art). 
 135.  8 DEP’T ST. BULL. 21(1943). 
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Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, issued written warnings to 
American museums against acquiring stolen artworks and asked for 
cooperation in researching and returning such artworks.136  The 
American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and 
Historic Monuments in War Areas publicized a circular in 1945 stating: 
It is, of course, obvious that no clear title can be passed on objects that 
have been looted from public or private collections abroad.  We 
believe, therefore, that it is to the advantage of both public institutions 
and the trade, as well as for the good name of this Government and its 
armed forces, that any specific examples of looting of works of art or 
cultural materials be brought to light as soon as possible.137 
Later on December 11, 1950, the State Department’s Division of 
Libraries and Institutes also wrote to all museums and art dealers and 
asked for help in spotting and returning artworks stolen from European 
public and private collections.138 
Moreover, the “Monuments Men” of the Monuments, Fine Arts and 
Archives Program (MFA&A) sought tirelessly to secure tremendous 
caches of stolen art to restore it to the source countries of victims.139  
After the Monuments Men’s return from Germany, many from the 
program became museum directors and academics in prestigious colleges 
and universities, where they told their stories.140  After the war, the State 
Department and other agencies, governments, and organizations issued 
                                                          
 136.  Letter from The Am. Comm’n for the Prot. & Salvage of Artistic & Historic Monuments in 
War Areas to Museums, Art & Antique Dealers & Auction Houses (1945) (on file with author). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Letter from Dep’t of State to Univs., Museums, Libraries, Art Dealers, & Booksellers (Dec. 
11, 1950) (on file with author). 
 139.  See CHARLES DE JAEGER, THE LINZ FILE: HITLER’S PLUNDER OF EUROPE’S ART 104 
(1981) (discussing how the MFA&A assessed damage to art and monuments in Europe); HENRY LA 
FARGE, LOST TREASURES OF EUROPE 11 (1946) (“The information on war damage in Italy is very 
complete, due to the excellent work of the Monuments and Fine Arts officers . . . .”); JAMES J. 
RORIMER, SURVIVAL: THE SALVAGE AND PROTECTION OF ART IN WAR 233 (1950) (“[A]ny attempt 
to give the complete story of the works of the enthusiastic, able and hard-working specialist officers 
at the Collecting Points and to tell the complete story of MFA&A work in Germany, would require 
another book.”).  James Rorimer, who later became Director of the Metropolitan Museum, on March 
14, 1944, met in person Rose Valland who scrupulously documented Nazi looting through the Jeu de 
Paume in Paris at great risk to her life.  ROBERT M. EDSEL & BRET WITTER, THE MONUMENTS MEN: 
ALLIED HEROES, NAZI THIEVES, AND THE GREATEST TREASURE HUNT IN HISTORY 134–35 (2009).  
Some art collectors told stories of having purchased looted art.  WILLIAM S. PALEY, AS IT 
HAPPENED, A MEMOIR 102 (1979). 
 140.  See, e.g., THE MONUMENTS MEN, www.monumentsmen.com/monumentsmen.php (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2012) (providing examples of Monuments Men who became museum directors, 
museum curators, and educators, among other professions). 
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warnings about looted objects infecting the market and publicized lists of 
stolen art and the identities of traffickers, including two names found in 
the provenance records in Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art,141 discussed 
below.142  Additionally, on October 4, 1954, a State Department report 
written by renowned art historian Ardelia R. Hall thanks numerous 
American museums for assisting in restituting manuscripts and art that 
had been taken from German municipal collections.143 
News stories ran in publications such as The New Yorker, which 
published a series of three articles in 1947 by the renowned cultural 
commentator Janet Flanner detailing the massive character of the Nazis’ 
spoliation of Jewish and other degenerate art.144  For example, on March 
1, 1947, Flanner described how Walter Hofer, a Berlin art dealer, who 
“with Göring behind him . . . could travel wherever he wished (usually in 
a Luftwaffe plane), compare markets, meet the bigwigs, and, above all, 
promise Nazi protection to those who were willing to exchange art for 
safety, dirt cheap.”145  She continued: “It was Hofer who worked out the 
heartless, shifty, pseudo-legitimate, semi-blackmail technique that 
characterized Göring’s wartime art deals, as distinguished from Göring’s 
art thefts.”146 
                                                          
 141.  772 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 403 F. App’x 575 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 102 (2011). 
 142.  See infra Part IV (explaining the dismissal of Holocaust-era art claims). 
 143.  Ardelia R. Hall, U.S. Program for Return of Historic Objects to Countries of Origin, 1944-
1954, 31 DEP’T ST. BULL. 493, 496 (Oct. 4, 1954).  Hall thanked the following museums: 
[T]he Smithsonian Institution, the Library of Congress, the Freer Gallery of Art, the 
National Gallery of Art, the Los Angeles County Museum, the University of Florida, the 
Art Institute of Chicago, the John Herron Art Institute of Indianapolis, the Museum of 
Fine Arts of Boston, the Fogg Museum of Art and the Busch-Reisinger Museum of 
Harvard University, the Detroit Institute of Arts, the Palace of the Legion of Honor 
Museum of San Francisco, the Duluth (Minnesota) Public Library, the Columbus (Ohio) 
Public Library, the Princeton University Library, the New York Public Library, the Frick 
Art Reference Library, the Morgan Library, the Cornell University Library, the Syracuse 
University Library, the Numismatic Society of New York, the Institute of Fine Arts of 
New York University, the Frick Collection, the New York Historical Society, the 
University of Pennsylvania Library, the Philadelphia Museum of Art, the Rhode Island 
School of Design, the Museum of Williams College, the Museum of Houston (Texas), 
and Lawrence College. 
  Id.; see also id. at 495 (“The recovery of these manuscripts and of other rare books and objects of 
art dispersed during or following World War II has been a part of U.S. Government policy.”). 
 144.  Janet Flanner, Annals of Crime: The Beautiful Spoils, NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1947, at 31; 
id. Mar. 1, 1947, at 33; id. Mar. 8, 1947, at 38. 
 145.  Id. Mar. 1, 1947, at 34. 
 146.  Id.  Flanner also details how the Dutch art market, which “had been frozen by the fear of 
the war, but under Nazi heat it thawed out and had its biggest boom in modern times,” was infected 
by the expropriation of the large Jacques Goudstikker gallery, after he attempted to flee, which 
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Interest revived in Holocaust-era assets in the 1990s, after 
declassification of a number of archives,147 which allowed some to begin 
the costly search for family assets and assert various legal claims; the 
revival, however, did nothing to negate the fact that the art world had 
contemporaneous knowledge about the massive infection of the market 
starting in 1933 and festering through today.  Museums knowingly 
acquired or accepted donations of paintings that were—or very likely 
were—stolen directly from Jews or sold by Jews under duress.148  Not 
caring does not equate to not knowing.  The law dictates that such 
transfers were and still are void.149  As succinctly stated by one student of 
the field whose work was cited on this point with approval by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: “[A]bsent other 
considerations an artwork stolen during World War II still belongs to the 
original owner, even if there have been several subsequent buyers and 
even if each of those buyers was completely unaware that she was 
buying stolen goods.”150  Thus, absent a technical defense, claims to such 
art should succeed today.151 
                                                                                                                       
 
contained art from Goudstikker’s own collection, as well as art owned in shares by many Jews who 
could not safely come to claim it after the Nazi takeover.  Id. at 35.  “Göring enjoyed first pick of the 
Goudstikker stock.”  Id.  She also described the role of Paris dealer Alois Miedl, who had traded 
with Göring to get his wife to safety in Switzerland, in trafficking through Switzerland, “where 
French moderns were prized and were accepted at face value.”  Id. at 38.  Moreover, after the war, 
the Dutch government, before eventually restituting the Goudstikker collection in 2008, 
characterized the family’s approach to restitution in laches-type language to justify retention of the 
collection: 
As you can see, wrote Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo, after the war, Jacques 
Goudstikker’s widow, Mrs. Goudstikker-Von Halban, chose consciously, and on the 
basis of expert legal and other advice, not to reclaim title to the paintings sold to Goering 
by her late husband’s art dealership.  Instead, she chose to keep the money she had 
received for them, but at the same time, elected to reclaim title to real estate and other 
property sold to Mr. Miedl . . . . 
GREGG J. RICKMAN, CONQUEST AND REDEMPTION 239 (2007). 
 147.  E.g., Michael J. Bazyler, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN 
AMERICA’S COURTS, at xi (2003) (“It is only now, with the intervention of the American courts, that 
elderly Holocaust survivors throughout the world are starting to see hope for compensation at last 
being realized.”). 
 148.  E.g., MoMA acquired one of the Grosz paintings at issue in 1946, and another in 1954.  
Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 403 F. App’x 575 (2d 
Cir. 2010), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 102 (2011).  The Toledo Museum of Art acquired a tainted 
Kokoschka in 1947.  Kreder, supra note 32, at 72. 
 149.  See Military Government Law 59, supra note 79; see also Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 
140 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that “[u]nlike Switzerland, in New York, a thief cannot pass good title.”). 
 150.  Michelle I. Turner, Note, The Innocent Buyer of Art Looted During World War II, 32 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1511, 1534 (1999), cited with approval in Bakalar, 619 F.3d at 141. 
 151.  For a discussion of the legal principles dictating restitution in such cases under U.S. law not 
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In conclusion, some current possessors of this property, including 
some of the world’s most esteemed museums like the MoMA, have 
essentially argued that Jews and opponents of National Socialism were 
able to freely and voluntarily transfer their property within the Third 
Reich after 1933.  This may have been possible in some instances,152 but 
was emphatically not true in general.153  Additionally, as it was almost 
futile to try to reclaim such transferred and looted art until recently,154 
how should statute of limitations and laches defenses apply?  
Furthermore, as Part III.C., discusses, it seems that we have only begun 
to scratch the surface of the historical record to understand the flimsiness 
of most assertions by art-world insiders of bona fide purchaser status.155  
In other words, cases to date have implicated only the most superficial 
level of evidence as to what buyers and donees knew when they came to 
possess Nazi-looted art, and courts should not continue to give present-
day possessors the benefit of the doubt in contravention of the standard 
                                                                                                                       
 
including other sources cited throughout this Article, see Bert Demarsin, Has the Time (of Laches) 
Come? Recent Nazi-Era Art Litigation in the New York Forum, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 621 (2011) 
(surveying Nazi-era artwork litigation in New York). 
 152.  See PALMER, supra note 82 at 59–60; see also PETROPOULOS, supra note 84, at 60–61 
(discussing the public sales of art in the 1930s); Judy Dempsey, Germany Tracing Artwork and Its 
Nazi Past, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/world/europe/22iht-
letter.4.18871861.html?_r=2 (“‘There is the issue of enforced transactions of every sale of every 
Jewish collection that happened during the Nazi times,’ said [Sean] Rainbird, a former curator of the 
Tate Modern in London. ‘There were cases where individuals were allowed to take their collections 
out of the country, and there were some dealers, in a gesture of solidarity, who helped them and were 
dealing with them in an honest way.’”); see also Zagorin, supra note 103, at 87 (inferring opposition 
to compensating claimants for works sold in the 1930s at what seemed to have been fair prices in 
that market and noting that the art market in New York “continued to function even as fighting raged 
in Europe.”). 
 153.  E.g., Sydney M. Drum, Comment, DeWeerth v. Baldinger: Making New York a Haven for 
Stolen Art?, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 909, 944 (1989) (“Because stolen art work can be very valuable, may 
eventually filter into the open market, and may be handled by the shadowy institution of the art 
gallery, art owners may be victimized by international trading in stolen art.  Original owners, 
however, have only a few fragmentary and little-known mechanisms by which to register or recover 
their stolen art objects.”), cited with approval in Bakalar, 619 F.3d at 141. 
 154.  Michael J. Reppas II, Empty “International” Museums’ Trophy Cases of Their Looted 
Treasures and Return Stolen Property to the Countries of Origin and the Rightful Heirs of Those 
Wrongfully Dispossessed, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 93, 94 (2007) (“The dawn of the 21st 
Century has brought a fresh breeze to the stale and stagnant course of requests for looted property to 
be voluntarily returned and the invariable refusal by the international museums.  The long held 
assumptions of nation-states and individuals that they are unable to challenge the museum’s 
ownership of these treasures, has changed to a more confident and confrontational stance whereupon 
they now believe they can legally compel the museums to return their looted treasures.”). 
 155.  See Bakalar, 619 F.3d at 148 (Korman, J., concurring) (describing how the purported Swiss 
transaction was premised on obvious lack of title in supposed seller yet the trial judge enforced such 
title). 
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application of Rule 12(b)(6).156  If almost an entire industry blocks 
recovery, how should these doctrines apply? 
C. Going Forward in Our Courts and Pursuing Truth and Memory 
The historical context outlined above should inform judges’ views of 
the plausibility of claims and defenses in Holocaust art cases.  By 
reducing the level of skepticism infecting first impressions of these 
historic claims, this Article seeks to insure that the judicial branch 
augments executive policy, laid out as early as 1951 in a Department of 
State Bulletin: “For the first time in history, restitution may be expected 
to continue for as long as works of art known to have been plundered 
during a war continue to be rediscovered.”157 
The full scope of trafficking in Nazi-looted art through Switzerland 
and into the United States—including into some of our most esteemed 
institutions—is still to be discovered.158  A report by art historian Laurie 
A. Stein was published in the final report of the Bergier Commission, an 
independent commission of experts established by the Swiss Parliament 
to study the role of Switzerland in art trafficking during World War 
II.159  The Bergier Report came out in March 2002.160  Stein’s report 
indicates that research to date has only scratched the surface of the 
“extraordinary breadth of traffic in art to the United States that was 
occurring in the Nazi era.”161  Stein stated that “the myths of American 
museum directors and collectors purchasing art in the 1930’s through 
Swiss sources, in order to rescue it from the National Socialists, need to 
be reconsidered.”162  She added: “It must be remembered that while 
                                                          
 156.  Id. at 152. 
 157.  Hall, supra note 1, at 339. 
 158.  See generally Lucille A. Roussin, The Price of Pictures, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 709 (2009) (discussing the growth of the art market since WWII, the importance of 
caution and consequence in investigation and purchase of artwork, and the debate over restitution 
surrounding artwork looted from Jewish families). 
 159.  Laurie A. Stein’s name is found on page 571 of the report under the heading “Members, 
General Secretaries, Staff and Mandatees of the ICE.”  FINAL REPORT, INDEP. COMM’N OF EXPERTS 
SWITZ., SWITZERLAND, NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (2002), 
http://www.uek.ch/en/index.htm (follow “Reports 2001/2002” heading; then follow “Final report” 
subheading). 
 160.  Id. at 36. 
 161.  Laurie A. Stein, The Path of Art from Switzerland to America from the Late 1930’s to the 
early 1950’s: A Report of Research Results, 2 (undated but commissioned for a 2002 report), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/51566381/Stein-Pyritz-Swiss-Government-Report (last visited Sept. 16, 
2012). 
 162.  Id. at 3. 
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Europe went to war, America was still conducting business as usual, 
even in the cultural arena—defining new museum collecting policies, 
mounting exhibitions, and building private collections from the best 
possible art available on the market.”163  
The report focuses mostly on art channeled into American 
museums via Nazi sales of degenerate art taken from German museums 
and auctioned in Switzerland—as advertised in the popular New York 
publication Art News—to raise foreign currency.164  Some art-world 
insiders could not resist the temptation to scoop up a masterpiece for a 
bargain despite knowing that the net effect would be to “transform works 
of art into armaments.”165  Many of those masterpieces were eventually 
sold or donated to American museums.166  The report fingers some well-
known institutions and people as having handled or ultimately received 
this art—MoMA, the Fogg Art Museum, Curt Valentin, “this country’s 
most influential figure in the development of modern art,” and Joseph 
Pulitzer, Jr., to name a few.167  
One could read the report to support a hypothesis that the high-
profile dealers and collectors who facilitated transactions to the named 
museums are likely many of the same individuals who trafficked looted 
Jewish-owned art in Switzerland.  This hypothesis finds support in 
another book that discusses the trafficking of degenerate art through 
Switzerland, Stephanie Barron’s “Degenerate Art”: The Fate of the 
Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany, which states in relevant part: 
                                                          
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 5. 
 165.  Id. at 15. 
 166.  See supra note 103. 
 167.  See Stein, supra note 161, at 9 (quoting art collector Morton May); see also Jane Wade 
Papers, Archives of American Art, Letter from Reich Chamber of Fine Arts to Curt Valentin, Re: 
Your letter of 22 September 1936 (Nov. 14, 1936), microformed on reel #2322, frame 929 (July 1, 
2002) (translation and original on file with author) (“The President of the Reich Chamber of Fine 
Arts instructed me to tell you that it would be of no objection to him if you make use of your 
connections with the German art circle and thereby establish supplementary export opportunities, if 
[this is done] outside Germany.  Once you are in a foreign country, you are free to purchase works 
by German artists in Germany and make use of them in America.”) 
(Swastika stamp after signature); Letter from Curt Valentin to Mrs. Dailey (July 23, 1948) (stating 
“Indescribable what became of Germany.  I wish I would not have come.  All bronzes by 
Matisse are cast in ten [sic]—and all are signed, and numbered.  The one mentioned I pulled 
from under his own bed.  I hope everything goes well with you.  I hope the summer is fine.  It’s 
raining over here ever since I came, no matter in which country I am hunting Art and people.”) 
(on file with author). 
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On February 19 Fischer[, the Swiss gallery that conducted auctions for 
the Nazis to raise foreign currency,] had received the first inquiry from 
abroad: Curt Valentin, writing from America, must have known of the 
impending sale from colleagues in Berlin.  He had emigrated from 
Germany the year before and opened a New York branch of Buchholz’s 
gallery (Buchholz being one of the four German dealers authorized by 
the National Socialists to sell ‘degenerate’ art).  Quickly establishing 
himself as the leading dealer in German Expressionist art in America, 
Valentin would indeed become one of the most important bidders at the 
auction.168 
In sum, to highlight the breadth of the issue, Stein wrote: “The range 
and constancy of recently-arrived works being offered and acquired by 
Americans evidences that the United States became a welcoming 
homeland for confiscated and looted art, and Switzerland became 
probably the most important conduit country for the rush of American art 
collecting during the era.”169  According to Stein’s report, “[i]t is clear 
that there was much more dealing between American-based buyers . . . 
either in front of the auction block or behind the scenes, than has been 
recognized up until now.”170 
IV. DISMISSAL OF HOLOCAUST-ERA ART CLAIMS DUE TO LACK OF 
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF KEY HISTORICAL FACTS 
The recent wave of dismissals of Nazi-era art cases was grounded in 
three errors: (1) misapplication of the discovery rule triggering the statute 
of limitations; (2) insufficient reliance upon historical evidence and 
historians’ expertise to understand the context of the claims; and (3) 
jurisdictional grounds—using that term a bit loosely—to include 
misinterpretation of the FSIA and federal preemption doctrine.171  The 
third reason is beyond the scope of this Article, but the other two are 
addressed below.  All three errors have distorted the historical record by 
                                                          
 168.  STEPHANIE BARRON, “DEGENERATE ART”: THE FATE OF THE AVANT-GARDE IN NAZI 
GERMANY 137 (Susan Caroselli, ed., 1991). 
 169.  Stein, supra note 161, at 37. 
 170.  Id. at 9. 
 171.  See Westfield v. Germany, No. 3:09-0204, 2009 WL 2356554, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. July 28, 
2009) (ruling, without even citing the seminal Bernstein case, that Germany could not be sued under 
the FSIA for any taking of property during war), aff’d on other grounds by 633 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 
2011); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 578 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing case 
under federal preemption principles).  But see Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157 
(C.D. Cal. 2006) (properly holding that Spain is subject to jurisdiction under the FSIA for possessing 
Nazi-looted art), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 580 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, appeal 
dismissed in part en banc, 616 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011). 
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precluding inquiry into what truly happened to the paintings at issue.  
Erring courts implicitly made incorrect and improper factual 
interpretations to reach their premature legal conclusions. 
A. Misapplication of the Discovery Rule and Related Time-Bar 
Principles 
In essence, the constructive discovery rule provides that in certain 
cases the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the claimant has 
or should have knowledge of the claim and of the correct entity to sue.172  
This rule “is highly fact specific and great discretion is left to judges to 
determine when to apply it.”173  “Generally, both actual and constructive 
notice are factual questions, determined by a jury.”174  The constructive 
discovery rule has been applied in conversion and restitution cases 
throughout the United States with the following variants.175 
First, New York is alone in following the “demand and refusal” rule 
in all conversion cases, which dictates that the limitations period begins 
to run only when the true owner demands the artwork’s return from the 
current possessor and is refused.176  This rule may sound extreme, but it 
                                                          
 172.  See generally Lauren F. Redman, A Wakeup Call for a Uniform Statute of Limitations in 
Art Restitution Cases, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 203 (2008) (discussing constructive discovery rule 
with respect to different state jurisdictions); Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: 
Conflict of Laws in Litigation Between Original Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 
50 DUKE L.J. 955, 1005 n.258 (2001) (“Where, as in this case, the parties either explicitly or by 
implication agree to be governed by the substantive law of the forum state, their agreement will be 
enforced.” (citing Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 1986))); see also Dunbar v. Seger-
Thomschitz (Seger-Thomschitz I), 638 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (E.D. La. 2009) (“The period for 
liberative prescription begins to toll when the claimant reasonably should have discovered the 
injury.” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1511 (2011). 
 173.  Redman, supra note 172, at 219. 
 174.  Schwartz v. Cincinnati Museum Assoc., 35 F. App’x 128, 131 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Charash v. Oberlin College, 14 F.3d 291, 300 (6th Cir. 1994)).  Coincidentally Oberlin College has 
refused to return a painting from the Grunbaum collection to the Grunbaum heirs.  Raymond Dowd, 
Nazi Looted Art at Oberlin College and Other U.S. Museums: Prague Conference on Holocaust-Era 
Assets, ART STOLEN FROM FRITZ GRUNBAUM (Aug. 14, 2009), http://artstolenfromfritzgrunbaum. 
wordpress.com/tag/egon-schiele/. 
 175. See, e.g., Redman, supra note 172, at 219–20; Reyhan, supra note 173, at 1021.  Claims 
may also be couched as quasi-contract or unjust enrichment.  E.g., Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz 
(Seger-Thomschitz II), 615 F.3d 574, 576 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1511 (2011); see 
also Seger-Thomschitz I, 638 F. Supp. 2d, at 662 (discussing civil law “innominate real action” 
(citing 2 YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 241, 476 (1991)); Museum of Fine 
Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz (Seger-Thomschitz III), 623 F.3d 1, 3–14 (1st Cir. 2010) (mentioning 
constructive trust, restitution, unjust enrichment, injunctive relief and replevin)), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 1612 (2011), reh’g denied, 131 S. Ct. 2176 (2011). 
 176.   E.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991). 
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is greatly tempered by the applicability of the laches defense, whereby a 
plaintiff’s claim will be barred if the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in 
bringing the claim and such delay caused the defendant to suffer 
prejudice.177  Second, California law on this issue is muddled,178 
especially because the constitutionality of statutes extending the 
limitations period in Holocaust-era cases have been struck down.179  
Third, Louisiana follows civil law prescription principles.180  Fourth and 
finally, a wrong-headed Michigan case recently held the discovery rule 
did not apply at all, so that a claim to Nazi-looted art expired in 1938.181 
Statutes of limitation exist to foster three primary goals: (1) to 
encourage plaintiffs to file suit promptly “on the premise that those with 
valid claims will not delay in asserting them”;182 (2) to promote “the free 
trade of goods, by making sure that those who have dealt with property 
in good faith can enjoy secure and peaceful possession after a certain, 
specified time period”;183 and (3) to protect defendants that may be 
                                                          
 177.  See id. at 430. 
 178.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West 2007); Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 741 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (discussing California statute of limitations in Holocaust-era case), cert. denied 552 U.S. 
990 (2007); Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Soc’y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); 
Soc’y of Cal. Pioneers v. Baker, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865, 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Redman, supra note 
172, at 213 (“California has the most chaotic approach . . . .”). 
 179.  Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 409, 420 (2003) (finding that California 
statute requiring reporting of unpaid Holocaust-era insurance policies was preempted by treaty); see, 
e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011) (striking down statute that would have authorized suits against museums and 
galleries); Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 709–12 (9th Cir. 2003) (slave labor claims 
preempted); Steinberg v. Int’l Comm’n on Holocaust Era Ins. Claims, 34 Cal. Reptr. 3d 944, 945 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (insurance claims preempted). 
 180.  See Seger-Thomschitz II, 615 F.3d at 576 (“[O]wnership of the painting, which had been 
open and continuous for well over ten years, fulfill[s] the requirements to establish ownership by 
acquisitive prescription under Louisiana law.”). 
 181.  Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 
2007). 
 182.  Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the Museum: A Proposed 
Solution to Disputes over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 15, 17 (1998); see also Suzette M. 
Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of Reparations Litigation, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 80 (2005) (explaining that those with strong evidence would not delay); 
PALMER, supra note 82, at 54–55. 
 183.  Lerner, supra note 182, at 17 (citing John G. Petrovich, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of 
Paintings, Statues and Statutes of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1122, 1127–28 (1980)).  
Additionally, the doctrine of adverse possession presents another nuance to the statute of limitations 
inquiry.  E.g., Paulina McCarter Collins, Has “The Lost Museum” Been Found? Declassification of 
Government Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets Offer Real Opportunity to “Do Justice” for 
Holocaust Victims on the Issue of Nazi-Looted Art, 54 ME. L. REV. 115, 129–31 (2002) (illustrating 
adverse possession and open enjoyment of property); Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of 
Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 119, 119 (1989) (“[T]he most important element required to 
establish adverse possession of personal property is the good faith and reasonable reliance of the 
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prejudiced in defending claims because of the loss of evidence over 
time.184  As demonstrated below, the recent wave of dismissals of 
Holocaust-era claims does nothing to further these goals. 
1. Dismissal of Holocaust-era Art Claims Does Not Encourage Prompt 
Filing of Complaints 
As for the first policy reason for statutes of limitations—that those 
with valid claims will act promptly—the courts are failing to recognize 
that many heirs are just now learning about their claims, or the ability to 
assert them with any chance of success.  This is due in part because “[a]s 
governments release records, cases are filed which lead victims or their 
heirs to file more cases with the increasing public awareness putting 
pressure on governments to cooperate.”185  Many archives and records 
remained sealed until the mid-1990s or are still sealed; as information 
trickled out, many survivors knowledgeable about a family’s wartime 
assets died.186 
In such cases, it is quite possible that no one in the family remains 
with the requisite knowledge to put two and two together and claim a 
particular looted painting.  It is not the case that the present-day 
claimants were fully informed about their claims but merely chose to do 
nothing about it for so long.187 
                                                                                                                       
 
adverse possessor.”). 
 184.  E.g., Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (noting that “statutory 
limitation periods are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and 
witnesses have disappeared.” (citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 
342, 348–49 (1944))); John H. Merryman, The Good Faith Acquisition of Stolen Art, Stanford Public 
Law Working Paper No. 1025515, Oct. 29, 2007, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1025515 (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). 
 185.  Redman, supra note 172, at 211. 
 186.  For a good discussion of this problem for claimants of Holocaust-era art, see Leah J. Weiss, 
Note, The Role of Museums in Sustaining the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 25 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 837, 866–69 (2007). 
 187.  In many cases, it simply was not politically feasible to reclaim the art.  Portrait of Wally 
involved facts that would have implicated a laches defense had it been brought for replevin rather 
than civil forfeiture.  See Third Amended Verified Complaint ¶ gg, United States v. Portrait of 
Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 99 Civ. 9940 (LAP), 2001 WL 34727703 (quoting 
handwritten note found upon victim’s death: “I myself prevent a Court case with the Belvedere 
(Museum for Modern Art in Vienna) as I was reinstated as the proprietor of the Gallery Würthle, 
Gallery exclusive for Modern Art, and as this it was not possible for me to quarrel with the Museum 
of Modern Art and tried to get my picture back by peaceful means.”). 
The litigation was settled for the full value of the portrait in 2010.  Press Release, U.S. Att’y 
Southern District of N.Y., U.S. Announces $19 Million Settlement in Case of Painting Stolen by 
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For example, one successful claimant who never would have 
recovered her property but for happenstance is Marie Altmann, the 
woman who claimed a number of masterpieces by Gustav Klimt in 
Austria and won them back—after her fight took her all the way to the 
Supreme Court.188  After the war, Altmann was still quite young and 
another family member on the continent, who hired an Austrian lawyer, 
handled the haggling with Austria for restitution.189  Generally, Jews 
seeking restitution from Austria immediately after the war did not enjoy 
much success.190  Because of the Austrian practice of extorting donations 
of Jews’ property in exchange for restitution and export permits, the 
lawyer struck a deal—some recovery is better than no recovery in a 
system that actively discriminates against persecuted refugees.191  
Altmann had no idea that she had a claim until the now-deceased 
journalist Hubertus Czernin sent her a package of historical documents 
he had unearthed.192  By that time, she was the last surviving heir of 
Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, from whom everything was taken during the 
war.193 
We lose historical knowledge as survivors pass away each day.  A 
recent bill passed by California that requires a claimant’s “actual 
discovery” to trigger the limitations period reflects this reality.194  The 
                                                                                                                       
 
Nazi (July 20, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July10/portraitofwally 
settlementpr.pdf; Press Release, Herrick, Feinstein LLP, The U.S. of Am., the Estate of Lea Bondi 
Jaray and the Leopold Museum Settle the Long-Standing Case Involving “Portrait of Wally” by 
Egon Schiele, (July 20, 2010), http://info.herrick.com/rs/vm.ashx?ct=24F76A15D4AE4EE0CD 
D881AFD42F921E91907ABFDA9818CF5AE175767CEAC80BDF416.  Other political persecutees 
have not been so fortunate.  See, e.g., Letter from George Grosz to Oz (Jan. 8, 1953) (original on file 
at the Otto Schmalhausen Archives and translation on file with author) (“The Modern Museum 
exhibited a stolen picture of mine (I am powerless to do anything against it), they bought it from 
someone who stole it.”). 
 188.  See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). 
 189.  Id. at 683. 
 190.  See id. at 682–83 (discussing the artwork export laws enacted in Austria in 1946). 
 191.  Id. at 705.  Other countries have similarly abysmal restitution records.  See, e.g., István 
Fodor, The Restitution of Works of Art in Hungary, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 96, at 92–94; 
Pavel Jirásek, Losses of Cultural Property From the Territory of the Czech Republic Due to World 
War II, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 96, at 232–33; Jan P. Pruszyński, Poland: The War 
Losses, Cultural Heritage, and Cultural Legitimacy, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 96, at 49–
52. 
 192.  See Grimes, supra note 61 (“In 1998, Ms. Altmann became aware of documents in the 
Austrian government archives uncovered by Hubertus Czernin, a journalist . . . .”). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  A.B. 2765, 2010 Leg., ch. 691 (Cal. 2010); see also Sheppard Mullin, California AB 2765 
Stops the Clock for Recovery of Wrongfully Appropriated Works: The Ramifications for Museums, 
Owners, Collectors and the Art Trade, ART LAW GALLERY BLOG (Oct. 11, 2010), 
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California Association of Museums opposed the bill, claiming that the 
“actual knowledge” standard is “vague and subjective” and noting the 
“great lengths” to which museums go to insure that what they acquire has 
“solid legal title.”195  These statements provoke responses.  First, the 
actual knowledge standard would be no more vague and subjective than 
the constructive discovery rule—currently in place throughout the 
country with relatively little variation.196  Second, as Part III 
demonstrates, the California Association of Museums’ understanding of 
the term “great lengths” likely stops, as to many objects, far short of any 
honest concept of diligence.197  In fact, willful blindness had been the 
norm in the art world.198  This standard exists because “[w]hile art 
dealers protest that they are only protecting the desire of their wealthy 
clients to remain anonymous, and that they are under no legal duty to 
inquire into the sources of art work they trade, such anonymity removes 
illegitimate transactions from needed scrutiny.”199  Unfortunately, the bill 
was struck down in Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art.200 
2. Dismissal of Holocaust-Era Art Claims Does Not Insure Free Trade 
and Secure Possession 
The second policy reason for statutes of limitations—promotion of 
free trade of goods—is largely premised on the concept of a good faith 
purchaser.  Courts seem to presume that purchasers of Holocaust assets 
possessed good faith despite extraordinary evidence to the contrary.201  
Perhaps the best example is Detroit Institute of Arts v. Ullin, in which the 
court ruled against the heirs of a Holocaust victim, deciding that the 
discovery rule did not apply because Michigan policy favors market 




owners-collectors-and-the-art-trade/ (explaining the history and impact of the bill). 
 195.  Letter from Barbara Long, et al., to Assemblymember Mike Feuer, Re: AB 2765 Civil 
Actions: Statutes of Limitation: Theft, at 3, 6 (Aug. 19, 2010) (on file with author). 
 196.  See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text. 
 197.  See supra Part III.B (discussing the acquisition of artworks by museums despite undeniable 
knowledge of the likelihood that those artworks were taken from Jews by force or duress). 
 198.  E.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 150 n.5 (2d Cir. 2010) (criticizing gallery owner who 
claimed “that to question a reputable dealer as to his title would be an ‘insult’”); Id. at 141 (noting 
“‘art dealers’ usual practice of not examining the sources of the art works in which they trade.” 
(quoting Drum, supra note 153, at 912)). 
 199.  Drum, supra note 153, at 912–13. 
 200.  592 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011). 
 201.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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certainty in cases alleging commercial conversion.202  Almost 
unbelievably, the court expressly ruled that the claim accrued in 1938, 
meaning that the state’s three-year statute of limitations expired in 
1941203—before the United States even landed on the beaches of 
Normandy and liberated survivors in death and work camps. 
When determining whether to strictly enforce the three-year statute 
of limitations or apply the discovery rule, courts “must carefully balance 
when the plaintiff learned of her injuries, whether she was given a fair 
opportunity to bring her suit, and whether defendant’s equitable interests 
would be unfairly prejudiced by tolling the statute of limitations.”204  In 
Ullin, the court did not engage in this balancing test.205  Even though 
Mrs. Nathan, the original owner of the painting, was forced by the Nazis 
to sell six other paintings and move other property to Switzerland, the 
court did not discuss the possibility that the sale of the painting in 
question resulted from wartime duress.206  Not only did the court ignore 
the duress element, but it also did not address the fact that Nathan’s heir 
denied that the sale of the painting even took place.207  Although she 
successfully sought restitution of other paintings after the war, Nathan 
did not seek to claim this painting, and her current claim was barred.208  
Rather than obtain more facts about the transaction surrounding the 
painting, the court decided that even if the discovery rule were 
applicable, Nathan’s heirs did not exercise due diligence.209 
One scholar has explained why the market certainty rationale is 
inapposite to stolen art cases: “Where the law favors purchasers over 
owners, purchasers have little incentive to cautiously investigate an 
artwork’s title.  Even galleries and auction houses have an incentive to 
ignore suspicious circumstances.  This is especially problematic in an 
area where theft is so rampant.”210 
                                                          
 202.  Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1, *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 
31, 2007). 
 203. Id. at *3. 
 204.  Stephens v. Dixon, 536 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Mich. 1995). 
 205.  See Ullin, 2007 WL 1016996. 
 206.  See id. 
 207.  See id. at *2 n.3. 
 208.  Id. at *2–4. 
 209.  Id. at *3. 
 210.  Redman, supra note 172, at 212 (footnotes omitted).  Moreover, purchasers’ claims against 
middlemen, such as breach of warranty, run from the date of purchase.  See Doss, Inc. v. Christie’s 
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 10577 (LAP), 2009 WL 3053713, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2009) (holding that 
plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when plaintiff bought a painting from defendant auctioneer that 
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3. Dismissal of Holocaust-Era Art Claims Unduly Protects Defendants 
from Loss of Evidence Over Time 
Courts heavily emphasize the third policy reason for statutes of 
limitations—protection of defendants—in Holocaust-era cases.  For 
example, the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts granted the Boston Museum of Fine Arts’ summary 
judgment motion on statute of limitations grounds in a declaratory 
judgment action filed against Dr. Seger-Thomschitz, heir of Dr. Oskar 
Reichel.211  Dr. Reichel was a Jewish doctor, art collector, and owner of a 
Viennese gallery, which was moved out of Vienna in February 1939, 
well after the Anschluss of Austria, and after he was forced to submit 
property declarations to the Viennese Nazis, including the Oskar 
Kokoschka painting in question, Two Nudes (Lovers).212  The court 
characterized the loss of the painting innocuously, as its having been 
“transferred to” an art dealer in Paris for sale.213 
The art dealer was Otto Kallir-Nirenstein (known as Otto Kallir), the 
most influential dealer on modern art collectors in the United States.214  
Shortly after the Anschluss, Kallir transferred his own Vienna gallery to 
his non-Jewish secretary,215 opened the Galerie St. Etienne in Paris, and 
moved to the United States in August of 1939 to open the New York 
branch of Galerie St. Etienne, to include the painting and other works.216  
Alfred Barr, MoMA Chairman, helped sponsor Kallir’s immigration.217  
Barr wrote a letter characterizing Kallir as a destitute, broken man,218 
                                                                                                                       
 
was subsequently discovered to have been stolen). 
 211.  Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz (Seger-Thomschitz IV), Civil Action No. 
08-10097-RWZ, 2009 WL 6506658, at *1, *11 (D. Mass. June 12, 2009), aff’d, 623 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1612 (2011), reh’g denied, 131 S. Ct. 2176 (2011). 
 212.  Id. at *1–2. 
 213.  Id. at *7. 
 214.  Id. at *1. 
 215.  See id. at *2.  This was a typical practice that Jews were forced to undergo in attempts to 
protect their property from Nazi-confiscation.  See DEAN, supra note 109, at 65.  But, questions have 
been raised whether Kallir was persecuted—or whether he was persecuted and later made a deal 
with the Nazis to broker transactions to bring them foreign currency. 
 216.  Seger-Thomschitz IV, 2009 WL 6506658, at *2. 
 217.  Letter from Alfred H. Barr, Jr., Director, The Museum of Modern Art, to Mr. Correa (June 
30, 1942) (on file with author) (“This letter is to testify to the loyalty to the United States of an alien, 
Mr. Curt Valentin, now in this country.  Mr. Valentin is a refugee from the Nazis both because of 
Jewish extraction and because of his affiliation with free art movements banned by Hitler.  He came 
to this country in 1937, robbed by the Nazis of virtually all possessions and funds.”). 
 218.  Id. 
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which is inconsistent with his ability to maintain such an active art trade 
during the war. 
Kallir’s name has been central to a number of the recently filed 
cases, as historians explore newly accessed documents, causing some to 
question his prior reputation as a white knight to fleeing Jews whose art 
was liquidated.219  The defendant museum submitted letters to the court, 
which had been written in the 1980s by one of Dr. Reichel’s sons, 
Raimund, to art historians independently researching Kokoschka’s 
work.220  Dr. Seger-Thomschitz argued that the letters indicate that Kallir 
had told Raimund that Dr. Reichel entrusted the paintings to him in 1938, 
perhaps even before the Anschluss.221 
Dr. Seger-Thomschitz argued that the correct interpretation of the 
letters—one of which states that Kallir said that he “lost his shirt” in the 
Kokoschka deal222—is that Raimund was misled into accepting a 
nominal $250 for the painting by Kallir’s misrepresentation as a 
persecutee, rather than a collaborator.223  Dr. Seger-Thomschitz prayed 
for the court to toll the statute of limitations on various grounds, 
including that Kallir, and then the museum, had engaged in fraudulent 
concealment.224  In essence, Dr. Seger-Thomschitz’s theory was that a 
number of Jewish dealers trafficking during the war purported to be 
persecutees, which the museums that accepted art from those dealers 
knew was false.  Consequently, the museums have unclean hands and 
thus should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations.  The 
court rejected her argument and found that there was “no evidence of bad 
faith, laches or unclean hands” on the museum’s part.225 
The court noted that, because the alleged illegitimacy of the transfer 
to Kallir was “not clear-cut, and all of the witnesses with first-hand 
knowledge of the transfer are now deceased,” the museum did not act in 
bad faith.226  Incredibly, the court provided as its sole justification for its 
holding the fact that “[o]ther museums faced with similar claims in 
                                                          
 219.  See Jason Horowitz, Dealer With the Devil, N.Y. OBSERVER, Sept. 11, 2007, at 2, 
http://www.observer.com/2007/09/dealer-with-the-devil/ (suggesting that recent litigation “blows a 
hole” in Kallir’s reputation). 
 220.  Seger-Thomschitz IV, 2009 WL 6506658 at *2–3. 
 221.  Id. at *3. 
 222.  Id. (quoting 1985 letter). 
 223.  See id. at *4 (arguing the transfer was “forced”). 
 224.  Id. at *10. 
 225.  Id. at *6. 
 226.  Id. 
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which the circumstances of a wartime transfer made the legitimacy of the 
transfer debatable have also refused to summarily return the artworks 
and, instead, sought declaratory judgments of ownership.”227  These facts 
demonstrate merely that many venerated American museums have 
convinced courts that the museums acted in good faith. 
The court also faulted Dr. Seger-Thomschitz for failing to obtain the 
same information the museum had, stating that she “had the same 
opportunity to obtain this evidence.”228  This is not true.  Even when 
claimants have sought judicial assistance in discovery to support 
Holocaust-era claims, they have been denied.229  Regardless of the merits 
of this particular case, it is ludicrous to suggest that any single person 
would have the same contacts and influence as one of the most 
prominent museums in the country to convince third parties to 
voluntarily produce information.  The court granted the museum’s 
summary judgment motion, which demands a standard much higher than 
plausibility—that “no genuine issue of material fact” exists.230  Is it 
plausible that the court drew all reasonable inferences in favor of Dr. 
Seger-Thomschitz, as it was required to do?231  Dismissal of the case shut 
down an avenue to compel production of documents relevant to this 
question from the museum and third parties who may have them—and 
consequently, the pursuit of truth and memory. 
Moreover, the court effectively found that Dr. Seger-Thomschitz was 
insufficiently diligent to prevent a finding that the discovery rule 
triggered the statute of limitations to run before the case was filed.232  
Kallir sold the Kokoschka to another gallery in 1945, which transferred it 
                                                          
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. at *10. 
 229.  See, e.g., In re Peters, 34 A.D.3d 29, 38–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (denying request under 
New York’s pre-action disclosure law to force identification of anonymous purchaser of painting 
claimed to be Nazi-looted art on limitations grounds).  But see In re Alexander, 33 A.D.3d 411, 412 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (ordering gallery to reveal name of buyer of stolen sculpture). 
 230.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 231.  See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1984); United 
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (“On summary judgment the inferences to be 
drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion.”). 
 232.  Seger-Thomschitz IV, 2009 WL 6506658, at *9.  This is true despite the common 
understanding that only New Jersey applies a due diligence requirement to the discovery rule in art 
cases.  See Bert Demarsin, The Third Time is Not Always a Charm: The Troublesome Legacy of a 
Dutch Art Dealer: The Limitation and Act of State Defenses in Looted Art Cases, 28 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 255, 264–68 (2010) (the “discovery rule” is an “equitable approach that provide[s] an 
alternative to the uncomfortable confines of the traditional adverse possession analysis.”); accord 
O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980). 
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to still another gallery.233  There it was purchased by Sarah Reed 
Blodgett between December 1947 and April 1948, who bequeathed it to 
the museum in 1972.234  The court concluded that certain “easily 
discoverable” facts would have put the family on notice of its claim long 
ago.235  For instance, over the years, the spectacular painting has been 
included in a number of exhibitions across the United States and the 
catalogue for at least one of those exhibitions lists Dr. Reichel as a prior 
owner; it has been included in three catalogue raisonnés236 of 
Kokoschka’s works; at least two of those listed Dr. Reichel as the prior 
owner; other publications have mentioned the work and Dr. Reichel’s 
prior ownership; the museum has utilized the painting in advertising and 
other publications; the museum has listed the painting’s provenance 
since December 2000 on its website; the Getty Provenance Index has 
included the painting’s provenance since the late 1980s;237 and a book 
published in Vienna in 2003 included a picture of the painting, the 
provenance, and the Reichel Nazi-era property declaration.238 
Dr. Seger-Thomschitz argued that it is excusable that Raimund, in 
pursuing post-war restitution, did not know of his father’s claims to the 
Kokoschka paintings because of the family’s diaspora resulting from 
Nazi persecution, including the murder of one of Dr. Reichel’s sons 
around 1940.239  Another son, Hans, fled Austria by June 1938.240  
Raimund also fled in 1938.241  In November 1938, Dr. Reichel’s art 
gallery, including its paintings, which were mostly by Romako, was 
liquidated because of his Jewish heritage.242  The family’s apartment 
house was liquidated in 1941.243  In January 1943, Dr. Reichel’s wife, 
Malvine, was deported to Therensiestadt, where she survived the war and 
eventually joined Hans in the United States.244 
                                                          
 233.  Seger-Thomschitz IV, 2009 WL 6506658, at *3. 
 234.  Id.  The museum’s formal acquisition was complete in 1973. 
 235.  Id. at *7, *9. 
 236.  Id. at *4 n.4 (citing DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 1987)) (stating that, 
“a catalogue raisonné is a comprehensive catalog of artworks by an artist”). 
 237.  Id. at *2. 
 238.  Id. at *9. 
 239. Answer and Counterclaim ¶ 46, Seger-Thomschitz IV, 2009 WL 6506658 (D. Mass. June 
12, 2009) (No. 08-10097), 2008 WL 8416218. 
 240. Id. ¶ 82. 
 241. Id. ¶ 46. 
 242. Id. ¶ 35. 
 243. Id. ¶ 37. 
 244. Id. ¶ 46. 
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The brothers’ post-war restitution application included a notarized 
statement by Raimund asserting that “[a] large art collection [owned by 
my father] was sold by force: 47 pictures by the painter Anton 
Romako.”245  He did not mention the Kokoschka paintings,246 but Dr. 
Reichel died after his wife was deported, leaving his sons with only their 
own recollections to rely on; they would not have known about the 
Kokoschka paintings due to their lack of access to the Austrian records 
that contained Dr. Reichel’s property declaration—at least until the 
records were first made public in 1993.247  By that time, presumably, 
they were no longer actively seeking restitution of property—they had 
gotten back what they could and moved on. 
Dr. Seger-Thomschitz herself was actually put on notice to 
investigate any remaining claims of Reichel’s heirs when the Vienna 
Community Council for Culture and Science contacted her in late 2003, 
following its own more-recent review of Viennese public collections.248  
The court determined that this was the moment that the limitations period 
began to run based on Massachusetts’s discovery rule.249  The Council’s 
letter stated that Vita Künstler, whom Kallir had appointed as director of 
his Vienna gallery, had delivered the Romako paintings, which had been 
listed on the Reichel property declaration and for which compensation to 
Dr. Reichel was placed into a blocked account.250  The Council 
concluded: “It is certain that these paintings involved art objects from the 
property of Dr. Oskar Reichel and which, in connection with the power 
seizure by National Socialism, he had to sell due to his persecution as a 
Jew to the galleries mentioned . . . .”251  Dr. Seger-Thomschitz argued 
that the path of the Romako paintings likely mirrored that of the 
Kokoschkas.252  However, the Answer and Counterclaim does not clearly 
allege that the proceeds of the sale of the Kokoschkas, if any, actually 
                                                          
 245. Id. ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 246. See id. 
 247. Id. ¶¶ 85–90. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Seger-Thomschitz IV, 2009 WL 6506658, at *9. 
 250.  The First Amended Answer and Counterclaim also states that “once the Painting was 
placed on Dr. Reichel’s Property Declaration—which the Nazis required all Jews to file—the 
Painting was effectively confiscated and owned by the Nazi state.”  First Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim ¶ 13, Seger-Thomschitz IV, 2009 WL 6506658 (No. 08-10097), 2008 WL 8416219.  
Such an argument could give legal force to Nazi confiscation policy.  The fact that Dr. Reichel had 
to list the painting may be a relevant factor in determining whether the sale actually was a farce, yet 
it should not be determinative of his ability to legally transfer title. 
 251.  Id. at 2 exhibit 1. 
 252.  Id. 
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went into a blocked account.253  This is probably missing because she 
cannot locate any documents to justify the allegation without the power 
of court-mandated discovery behind her.  Under Rule 11(b)(3), parties 
are prohibited from making factual contentions to a court unless they 
“have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have 
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery.”254 
Dr. Seger-Thomschitz was also sued in a declaratory action filed in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana by 
the current holder of Portrait of a Youth (Hans Reichel), another painting 
by Kokoschka.255  The facts are similar.  The Fifth Circuit ruled, on 
August 20, 2010, that the issues raised on appeal were not preserved 
below and thus could not be addressed, but noted: “Significantly, those 
members of the Reichel family with direct knowledge of the painting’s 
sale never sought its return.”256  The district court granted the present-day 
collector’s summary judgment motion on the grounds of Louisiana’s 
acquisitive prescription doctrine.257  The court found that, under the 
doctrine, the collector’s ownership was open and continuous because the 
collector “displayed the painting in her home, and Plaintiff loaned the 
painting for exhibitions at local and national galleries, further publicizing 
its location and its ownership.”258  The opinion provides no other details 
concerning the level of public knowledge about the painting, but, again, 
it misses the mark as to what would be reasonable for Holocaust 
survivors and their heirs who lost property to do. 
It was unforeseeable to the average person before the mid-1990s that 
the archives would be opened and some records published, more than 
fifty years after the Jews’ persecution.  At what point—after seeking 
some post-war restitution and reaching the point of futility—could 
survivors and heirs justifiably conclude that no more restitution was 
                                                          
 253.  Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 239, ¶ 4 (“Indeed, in Dr. Reichel’s case in particular, 
preceding sales proceeds for his artworks had been placed in ‘blocked’ accounts accessible only to 
the Nazis.  Upon information and belief, even if Kallir[] had made any payment to Dr. Reichel, the 
money would have ended up in a ‘blocked’ account and in exclusive Nazi hands.”); see also id. ¶¶ 
52, 81. 
 254.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
 255.  Seger-Thomschitz I, 638 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661 (E.D. La. 2009), aff’d, 615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1511 (2011). 
 256.  Seger-Thomschitz II, 615 F.3d 574, 576 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1511 
(2011). 
 257.  Seger-Thomschitz I, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 663. 
 258.  Id. 
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possible?  Moreover, the district court announced a due diligence 
requirement whereby Holocaust victims and their heirs will be barred 
unless, since the war, they successfully placed advertisements in 
publications and actively hunted down their art collections.259  The court 
took no notice that only one jurisdiction in the country has imposed a due 
diligence requirement of any type on art recovery claimants.260  One 
wonders how many refugees had the funds in the post-war, pre-internet 
environment to finance such a potentially endless, fruitless hunt for 
assets on multiple continents.261  There were a few refugees and heirs, 
with thorough knowledge and documentation of their extensive art 
collections, who were able to continue confronting the past to track down 
their property beyond the immediate post-war period, but that number 
was low.262  Furthermore, once those heirs who had direct knowledge of 
art collections passed away, there was not necessarily anyone left with 
the requisite knowledge to conduct a search.  As discussed above, heirs, 
such as Dr. Seger-Thomschitz, are learning about their claims today by 
happenstance.263 
Sadly, one federal court has used the fact that Congress conducted 
hearings in 1998 into wartime trafficking and the failure of post-war 
restitution against an heir, holding that public knowledge of the issue 
would have put a reasonable person on notice to investigate possible 
claims if members of her family were victims or survivors.264  In Toledo 
Museum of Art v. Ullin, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio granted a motion to dismiss the claim of the heirs of 
Martha Nathan in a declaratory judgment action filed by the Toledo 
                                                          
 259.  Id. at 663–64. 
 260.  See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 876 (N.J. 1980) (requiring consideration of the 
claimant’s actions toward recovering the stolen artifact).  The Seger-Thomschitz I court correctly 
cited O’Keeffe to support adopting a novel legal standard, which it failed to recognize as such.  
Seger-Thomschitz I, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 663.  It also cited an inapposite case, Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church of Cypress v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 283 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
 261.  See, e.g., Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (involving a claimant 
who had actively sought artworks after the war). 
 262.  In addition to the estate in Vineberg, the heirs to the Goudsticker and Herzog collections 
managed to actively search after the war with varying degrees of success resulting from their 
decades of efforts.  Carol Vogel, An Art Trove, Looted by the Nazis and Recovered, is Going on 
Sale—Culture—International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/02/21/arts/21iht-heir.4677497.html?pagewanted=2; Complaint at 1, de Csepel v. Republic of 
Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 10-1261), 2010 WL 2940163, at *1. 
 263.  See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 264.  Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 807–08 (N.D. Ohio 2006). 
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Museum of Art.265  The museum convinced the court to foreclose the 
claim, although Nathan fled Germany in 1938.266  She returned to 
Germany briefly in 1939 and was forced to sell some art; the painting in 
question, Street Scene in Tahiti, was not among those paintings because 
it had been shipped previously to Switzerland.267  Some of her other 
property was shipped to France and later expropriated after the Nazi 
occupation.268  In December 1938, before the German occupation of 
France, Nathan sold some of her artwork, including the painting in 
question, for $6,900 in Switzerland to three Jewish art dealers—Justin 
Thannhauser, Alexander Ball, and George Wildenstein.269 
Implicit in the court’s decision is a characterization of the sale as 
fair, which constitutes an improper finding of fact on a motion to 
dismiss: “In short, this sale occurred outside Germany by and between 
private individuals who were familiar with each other.  The Painting was 
not confiscated or looted by the Nazis; the sale was not at the direction 
of, nor did the proceeds benefit, the Nazi regime.”270  This finding 
implies that the Nazis’ reach was limited to the borders of the Reich, 
which is not true.  As recently recognized by the Second Circuit, the 
Nazis pressured Jews to transfer property located outside the Reich in 
exchange for safety for themselves or others.271  The Second Circuit 
stated: “Of particular significance is the ordinance dated April 26, 1938, 
which required Jews to register their assets and which covered both those 
who sought to leave the Reich . . . and those who remained, with the 
Reich seeking to appropriate their domestically as well as their externally 
held assets.”272 
Just a few months after the dealers purchased Nathan’s painting in 
Switzerland, in May of 1939, the Toledo Museum of Art purchased the 
painting for $25,000273—just as the Nazis were preparing to invade 
                                                          
 265.  Id. at 809. 
 266.  Id. at 803. 
 267.  Id. at 804. 
 268.  Id. 
 269.  Id. at 805. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 138 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 272.  Id. (quoting Claims Resolution Tribunal: Deposited Assets Claims: Selected Laws, 
Regulation, and Ordinances Used by the Nazi Regime to Confiscate Jewish Assets Abroad, available 
at http://crt-ii.org/_nazi_laws/).  The court also cited ROBERT GALLATELY, BACKING HITLER: 
CONSENT AND COERCION IN NAZI GERMANY 124 (2001); Otto D. Tolischus, Goering Starts Final 
Liquidation of Jewish Property in Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1938, at 1. 
 273.  Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 804–05. 
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Poland in September.274  The Ullin court faulted the Nathan heirs for not 
seeking restitution earlier because the museum “has had the Painting on 
display in Ohio and internationally since 1939 with Martha Nathan noted 
as prior owner.”275  Thus, the court concluded that the heirs were less 
than diligent.276  The judge might have unconsciously acted on a bias that 
a Jew would not have been forced to sell to a Jewish art dealer. 
Another declaratory judgment action, filed by the MoMA and the 
Guggenheim, sought to shut down the claims of Julius Schoeps, heir to 
Paul Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, for paintings that passed through 
Thannhauser’s hands.277  The museums alleged that it is simply 
implausible and contrary to common sense to suggest that any Jewish art 
dealer would take advantage of a fellow Jew.278  Some surely acted 
honorably as an act of solidarity,279 but it is likely that a few who were 
successful during the Reich, perhaps including Thannhauser as alleged in 
Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps280 did not.  The fact that these Jews 
may have been later persecuted when the Nazis no longer had a need for 
them does not discount the possibility that they trafficked in looted art.  
Schoeps settled on the eve of trial,281 which should teach us a lesson 
                                                          
 274.  See Otto D. Tolischus, Hitler to Inspect Western Defenses, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1939, at 
22 (stating that Germany counters British encirclement policy by confirming the strength of and 
expanding its alliances and military); Guido Enderis, Nazis Say Axis Tie Will Be Unlimited, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 9, 1939, at 8 (stating that Germany and Italy formalize their military alliance in the face 
of encirclement powers and doubt of Axis powers). 
 275.  Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805, 807–08. 
 276.  See id. at 807–08 (“These inquiries and ordinary diligence would have revealed the sale of 
the Painting in 1938.  Certainly by 1998, at the latest, Defendants had sufficient notice to alert them 
to the possibility of wrongdoing surrounding the Painting.”). 
 277.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief ¶¶ 1–4, Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, 549 F. Supp. 
2d 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07 Civ. 11074 (JSR)), 2007 WL 5161566. 
 278.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 279.  See Dempsey, supra note 152 (“There is the issue of enforced transactions of every sale of 
every Jewish collection that happened during the Nazi times,” said [Sean] Rainbird, a former curator 
of the Tate Modern in London.  “There were cases where individuals were allowed to take their 
collections out of the country, and there were some dealers, in a gesture of solidarity, who helped 
them and were dealing with them in an honest way.”). 
 280.  According to Schoeps’ Answer and Counterclaim: 
Thannhauser trafficked in stolen and Nazi-looted art during his career as a dealer.  Both 
during and after World War II, Thannhauser partnered with art dealers such as Nazi 
Cesar Mange de Hauke and Albert Skira, both of whom the U.S. State Department and 
others identified as traffickers in Nazi-looted art. 
Answer and Counterclaim ¶ 40, Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, 549 F. Supp. 2d 543 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (No. 07 Civ. 11074 (JSR)), 2008 WL 1982812 (citing Maureen Goggin & Walter V. 
Robinson, Murky Histories Cloud Some Local Art, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1997, at A1). 
 281.  Christine Kearney, NY Museums Settle in Claim of Nazi-looted Picassos, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 
2009, 11:24 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-37796820090202. 
KREDER FINAL COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2012  11:49 AM 
118 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
about what can happen in these cases when judges do not let their biases 
cloud their views of what is plausible, and let cases proceed. 
B. Improperly Granting Motions to Dismiss Prevents Discovery of 
Historical Facts Necessary to Develop Claims 
One court has gone so far as to dismiss a claim, in 2010, on the 
grounds that the Plaintiff missed the statute of limitations by just three 
months.  Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art282 was dismissed on the 
improper and incorrect theory that settlement communications triggered 
the limitations period under New York’s “demand and refusal” rule283 
despite the mandate of Federal Rule of Evidence 408 that such evidence 
may be used to “negat[e] a contention of undue delay.”284  The court also 
made other improper factual conclusions.285 
“In this case, a German modernist artist later deemed to be an 
‘enemy of the State,’ [George Grosz], fled Germany in January 1933, 
leaving his work with Jewish art dealer Alfred Flechtheim.  Later, 
Flechtheim also fled.  The Nazis aryanized Flechtheim’s galleries in 
November 1933.”286  The museum acquired the works Grosz left with 
Flechtheim, Portrait of the Poet Max Herrmann-Neisse (with Cognac) 
(Poet), Self-Portrait with Model (Model) and Republican Automatons, in 
1952, 1954, and 1946, respectively.287 
                                                          
 282.  772 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 403 F. App’x 575 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 102 (2011). 
 283.  Id. at 483. 
 284.  FED R. EVID. 408. 
 285.  The disputed issues of facts include: whether or not MoMA refused the Grosz Heirs’ 
claims prior to April 12, 2006; whether or not Lowry was authorized by MoMA’s Board of Trustees 
to issue a refusal prior to April 12, 2006; whether or not the Lowry Letter to Jentsch was an 
inadmissible settlement communication; whether or not Jentsch understood the Lowry Letter to be a 
refusal, and even if he did, whether it was within the scope of Jentsch’s apparent authority to be 
notified of a refusal where the facts show that Lowry was in direct communication with the Grosz 
Heirs and Jentsch was not an attorney; and whether or not Lowry’s claims that he had no authority to 
refuse the Grosz Heirs’ claims, together with MoMA’s June 26, 2008, letter confirming that a refusal 
took place on April 12, 2006, lulled the Grosz Heirs into believing that the statute of limitations 
would expire on April 12, 2006, and whether the Grosz Heirs’ reliance on MoMA’s representations 
was reasonable, warranting estoppel.  Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, 17, 
22, 29, 38–39, Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 403 Fed. App’x 575 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 10-257-
cv), 2010 WL 2648161. 
 286.  Brief for Am. Jewish Congress, Comm’n for Art Recovery et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 23, Grosz, 403 F. App’x 575 (No. 10-257-cv), 2010 
WL 2601991 (footnote omitted). 
 287.  Brief and Special Appendix, supra note 285, at 15. 
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First, Judge McMahon of the United States District Court of the 
Southern District of New York improperly found that the statute of 
limitations began to run during settlement negotiations and prior to 
MoMA’s refusal letter of April 12, 2006.288  Under New York law, a 
cause of action accrues against a bona fide purchaser, and thus the statute 
of limitations begins to run, “when the purchaser refuses to return the 
property in question.”289  A refusal need only “convey[] an intent to 
interfere with the demander’s possession or use of his property.”290  The 
district court based its ultimate conclusion on this point, isolating 
snippets of ongoing written and oral communications between Glenn 
Lowry, MoMA’s Director, and Ralph Jentsch, an art historian hired by 
the Groszes to research their claims.291  Lowry repeatedly stated that he 
did not have authority to resolve the Grosz claim until the MoMA Board 
of Trustees could vote to adopt a report on the claim from an internal 
investigation conducted by Nicholas Katzenbach, who was not a 
provenance researcher, but rather served as U.S. Attorney General during 
the Lyndon B. Johnson administration.292  For example, in a January 18, 
2006, letter Lowry wrote: “As I have told you many times, including at 
our meeting in early January, any decision on a matter like this must be 
considered by the Museum’s Trustees.”293  Lowry on April 12, 2006, sent 
Jentsch a letter stating that Katzenbach completed his report, which 
recommended that the claim be denied, and that the “Museum’s Board of 
Trustees has unanimously decided to accept Mr. Katzenbach’s report and 
to abide by its findings.”294  It is worth noting that Katzenbach’s report is 
based solely on his assessment of the applicable statute of 
limitations295—not on the factual truth of Nazi looting as called for by 
AAMD Guidelines, the Washington Principles, and the Terezín 
                                                          
 288.  Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 483–84. 
 289.  Id. at 482 (citing Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161 (2d Cir. 
1982)). 
 290.  Id. at 483 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Feld v. Feld, 720 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 291.  See id. at 485–88. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Brief for Am. Jewish Congress et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants and 
Reversal, supra note 286, at a-26 app.F, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1628670. 
 294.  Id. at a-26 app.F. 
 295.  Minutes of Meeting of the MoMA Bd. of Trs. at 2 (April 11, 2006) (on file with author). 
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Declaration.  In 2008, MoMA sent a letter to Grosz’s recently hired 
counsel reconfirming the refusal date of April 12, 2006.296 
This dismissal was improper.  Under Rule 9(f) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss on limitations grounds is 
appropriate only when the material averments of time and place in the 
complaint demonstrate that the claim is time-barred.297  Further, courts 
may not determine contested facts concerning when a statute of 
limitations began to run on a motion to dismiss,298 and such a 
determination is inappropriate before discovery begins on the issue.299  
Judge McMahon herself referred to Lowry’s words as “temporizing 
language [that] was almost certainly designed to entice plaintiffs to 
continue negotiating and to prevent the dispute from becoming public or 
escalating into litigation.”300  Thus, even had the limitations period run, 
Lowry’s “temporizing language” calls for application of the equitable 
doctrines of tolling and estoppel.301 
Second, the court made other erroneous and improper factual 
conclusions.  The district court wrongly suggested in ruling on this 
motion to dismiss that the reason why Flechtheim went out of business 
was that he was in general financial distress, a distortion of the historical 
                                                          
 296.  Letter from Henry A. Lanman, Assoc. Gen. Counsel of MoMA, to attorney David J. 
Rowland (June 26, 2008) (on file with author). 
 297.  See Matthew v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 433, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that 
Rule 9(f) permits consideration of allegations of time and place and is used as a screening device 
permitting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where the averments in the complaint make clear the claim 
is time-barred); Gossand v. Gossand, 149 F.2d 111, 113 (10th Cir. 1945); accord Santana-Castro v. 
Toledo-Davila, 579 F.3d 109, 113–14 (1st Cir. 2009); Bethal v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 
1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978); Herron v. Herron, 255 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 298.  See, e.g., Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining 
that the lapse of a limitations period is an affirmative defense that the defendant may raise in a 
“12(b)(6) motion if the defense appears on the face of the complaint.” (emphasis added)). 
 299.  See id.  It should be noted that in the letters Lowry offered potential shared ownership of 
one painting—even to withdraw MoMA’s ownership claims.  Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 
F. Supp. 2d 473, 486 (S.D.N.Y.) (“In the spirit of friendship and recognition of the limitations on the 
present state of our knowledge about the provenance of the work, I suggested the possibility of 
shared ownership of [Poet] at our May 31 meeting.”), aff’d, 403 F. App’x 575 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 102 (2011). 
 300.  Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 487. 
 301.  See Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of 
Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 89–90 (2005) (providing the general rule that a 
defendant cannot assert a time limitation if the defendant intentionally or unintentionally induced the 
plaintiff to postpone filing a complaint); Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the Limitations of 
Limitations Law, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1015, 1043 (1997) (“Equitable estoppel prohibits a defendant 
from being able to involve the statute of limitations defense where he has taken active steps to 
prevent a plaintiff from timely filing.”). 
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record.302  The court stated: “These documents suggest that Flechtheim’s 
liquidation was precipitated by his acute financial troubles, going back as 
far as 1931, before the Nazis came to power . . . .  Notwithstanding his 
financial missteps, Flechtheim continued to consign Grosz’s works on an 
ad hoc basis until his death in London in 1937.”303  This judgment 
ignores systematic boycotting and extortion of Jews to gain their 
property, in and out of the Reich, starting in 1933 and with imposition of 
the Flight Tax, which actually should be considered matters appropriate 
for judicial notice.304  Moreover, the massive Nazi theft of art is well 
documented, not only as a general historical fact, but also as a specific 
fact about Flechtheim’s galleries in Berlin and Dusseldorf in a 2001 
report of the Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland (ICE), 
also known as the Bergier Commission.305  The report found the 
Flechtheim gallery was raided and boycotted by the Nazis and was 
Aryanized; the relevant excerpts are as follows: 
As early as in March 1933 the Nazis raided an auction at the 
Duesseldorf branch [of the Flechtheim Galleries] which consequently 
had to be stopped. 
. . . . 
A few days later an attack article appeared in the “Volksparole” 
(“People’s Word”) under the headline “Misguided Patronage: How 
Flechtheim and Kaesbach Made German Art.”  The boycott drove the 
company to the brink of ruin.  The branches in Berlin and Duesseldorf 
were “aryanized” in November 1933; subsequently Flechtheim was 
expelled from the Reich Chamber of Culture. 
Due to the boycott measures and the negative press in connection with 
the “aryanization” of Galerie Flechtheim, Alex Voemel [who took over 
the Flechtheim Galleries] was faced with a large amount of debt and 
attempted to satisfy creditors by “payment in kind,” i.e. the pledging of 
works of art from the storage and private collection of Flechtheim.306 
Flechtheim’s estate was later sold via a sham auction in the 
Netherlands, which MoMA alleged was a perfectly legal transaction.307  
                                                          
 302.  Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
 303.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 304.  See supra Part III.A and notes 109–21. 
 305.  FINAL REPORT, supra note 159. 
 306.  FRANCINI, ET AL., supra note 114, at 318 (footnotes omitted). 
 307.  Brief for Defendants-Appellees, Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 403 F. App’x 575 (2d 
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The works later passed through Curt Valentin.308  Again, Valentin was 
the partner of Karl Buchholz, one of Goebbels’ four authorized dealers 
for art deemed degenerate by the Nazis.309  Buchholz was listed as a “red 
flag” name in the 1946 final report issued by the U.S. War Department’s 
Art Looting Investigation Unit.310 
MoMA’s experts advanced theories that Flechtheim or his wife 
gifted Poet to Charlotte Weidler or that she received it as an 
inheritance.311  MoMA’s experts opined, based on their review of 
documents—never even made available to the Grosz heirs in the course 
of litigation—that Weidler had an “anti-Nazi reputation.”312  In 
astonishing contrast to this characterization, the Grosz heirs’ historian 
unearthed a letter from Weidler to the Carnegie Institute, dated October 
30, 1939, after the Nazi invasion of Poland, which states: “They are nice 
in the Propoganda [sic] Ministr[y] and they told me again that they are 
much interested in the Carnegie-Institute and because your sales will 
bring dollars in the country.”313 
The dismissal of Grosz cannot be squared with the standards 
announced in Twombly and Iqbal.  To the contrary, the massive Nazi 
theft of art is well documented, including specific facts about 
Flechtheim’s galleries in Berlin and Dusseldorf.314  There is also a 
powerful historical consensus about the Nazi program of selling stolen 
artwork to American collectors and museums.315  It is further widely 
acknowledged that the chief obstacle complicating provenance research 
is that the Nazis went out of their way to disguise their grand larceny as a 
                                                                                                                       
 
Cir. 2010) (No. 10-257), 2010 WL 3948664, at *7. 
 308.  Curt Valentin Papers in The Museum of Modern Art Archives, MoMA, http:// 
moma.org/learn/resources/archives/EAD/Valentinf (last visited Aug. 31, 2012); see also supra notes 
164–68 and accompanying text. 
 309.  See supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text. 
 310.  Post-War Reports: Art Looting Intelligence Unit (ALIU) Reports 1945-1946 and ALIU Red 
Flag Names List and Index, LOOTEDART.COM, http://www.lootedart.cm/aliv-long (last visited Sept. 
17, 2012).  See generally Nancy H. Yeide, The Plunder of Art as a War Crime: The Art Looting 
Investigation Unit Reports and the Hermann Goering Art Collection, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 
13 (2007) (discussing the systematic and selfish confiscation of artwork by Reichsmarshall Herman 
Goering). 
 311.  Corrected and Amended Expert Report of Laurie A. Stein, Grosz v. Museum of Modern 
Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (09 Civ. 3706), 2009 WL 6485929. 
 312.  Id. 
 313.  Letter from Charlotte Weidler to Homer Saint-Gaudens at Carnegie Institute, Dep’t of Fine 
Arts (Oct. 30, 1939) (on file with the Kansas Law Review). 
 314.  FINAL REPORT, supra note 159. 
 315.  See supra Part III. 
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series of open transactions between willing sellers and buyers.316  Under 
New York law, the burden of demonstrating title lies with the present-
day possessor.317  In light of such uniform scholarly consensus and the 
burden of proof, the district court should have held that the complaint 
satisfied the Twombly–Iqbal standard of plausibility. 
Moreover, it is good fundamental policy to encourage 
communication for negotiation and settlement purposes.318  Precisely to 
secure meaningful negotiations, courts should toll the state statute of 
limitations for the duration of negotiation and settlement discussions.319  
In addition to complying with fundamental policy applicable to all 
litigation, such a course also furthers the Washington Principles and 
Terezín Declaration.320  Precedent to the contrary is lamentable.  The 
country that led the way in organizing worldwide support for the 
Washington Principles now has a great deal of federal judicial precedent 
that distorts historical remembrance and even encourages—in fact 
dictates—that parties run to the courthouse instead of negotiate in good 
faith over the restitution of Holocaust-era assets that were unlawfully 
seized during the height of genocidal cruelty.  Lowry’s language 
indicating that MoMA wanted to continue to pursue a just and fair 
solution set up an agreement to continue research for years and share 
ownership forever in no way notified Jentsch or the Grosz heirs that 
MoMA had refused to continue working toward an agreement.  This kind 
of cooperation in search of a just and fair solution instead of litigation is 
exactly what the Washington Principles, Terezín Declaration, and 
AAMD Guidelines encourage. 
The court was prone to make these legal errors because it also 
wrongly denied discovery of documents relevant to MoMA’s chain of 
                                                          
 316.  See AMY NEWMAN, THE NUREMBERG LAWS: INSTITUTIONALIZED ANTI-SEMITISM 79 
(1999) (“[T]he effort to return stolen art to its original owners has been hampered by falsified sales 
documents . . .”). 
 317.  Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991)). 
 318.  E.g., Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 568 F.3d 345, 352 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 319.  Yasuhei Taniguchi, Good Faith and Abuse of Procedural Rights in Japanese Civil 
Procedure, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 167, 180 (2000) (“[T]he parties to a litigation seem to have a 
legitimate interest in keeping an action alive while negotiating a settlement.  The statute of limitation 
is tolled while an action is pending.”).  See generally Stephanie Cuba, Note, Stop the Clock: The 
Case to Suspend the Statute of Limitations on Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 447 (1999) (discussing the need to suspend the statute of limitations regarding stolen 
artwork because many people are now locating missing art or realizing they have a potential claim). 
 320.  See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text. 
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title for the paintings.321  The Grosz heirs’ appellate brief lays out the 
issue nicely: 
From May 2009 through December 2009 document discovery and 
depositions, including art history expert and foreign legal expert 
discovery, was completed with the exception of outstanding disputes 
over inter alia MoMA’s refusal to permit inspection of provenance 
documentation of Nazi-era artworks in its collections from 
Flechtheim’s inventory and from Charlotte Weidler and Curt Valentin, 
the art dealers who sold Poet to MoMA. 
As reflected in MoMA’s proposed expert reports, MoMA’s theory of 
the case is that the post-March 1933 sales of Flechtheim’s inventory 
were legal, that the Dutch sales of Flechtheims’ estate was legal and 
that Weidler received Poet as an inheritance from Flechtheim’s estate 
or as a gift from Flechtheim’s wife Betty after his death. 
During discovery, the Grosz Heirs tried to explore MoMa’s documents 
related to Flechtheim’s inventory and into artworks acquired through 
Weidler and Valentin and were blocked.  In stark contrast, MoMA’s 
purported expert art historians had free reign of MoMA’s documents 
during discovery. 
. . . . 
. . . It is standard, and indeed required, practice in provenance research 
to research all items in a lost art collection to understand the 
circumstances of its dispersal.  MoMA’s website shows five artworks 
that were in Alfred Flechtheim’s inventory in 1933.  Yet the Grosz 
Heirs were denied discovery into MoMA’s documentation of the 
provenance of these artworks.322 
 
Finally, the court was completely uninformed as to how the 
allegations should be viewed, and shut down discovery into the full 
factual context, which was necessary to correctly understand the 
allegations.  The Grosz heirs’ appellate brief has it absolutely correct: 
“[T]he District Court should have permitted discovery into artworks in 
MoMA’s collection that came from Flechtheim, Weidler and Valentin to 
permit the Grosz heirs to . . . [rebut] MoMA’s defense that Flechtheim’s 
liquidation was legitimate . . . .”323  Furthermore, the judge’s manner of 
                                                          
 321.  Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 285, at 24. 
 322.  Id. at *20 (citations omitted). 
 323.  Id. at *53. 
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dealing with the discovery dispute seems oddly emotional, such as where 
she noted that additional letters to the court by the parties would be 
placed in the trash.324  She also criticized some of the Grosz heirs’ 
evidence as “rank hearsay”325 even though there is absolutely no 
requirement in any rule that a complaint must rely solely on admissible 
evidence.326 
In conclusion, it was improper to dismiss the case by divorcing it 
from historical context and forbidding inquiry into the proper context via 
discovery.  As Katzenbach noted, “[a]fter many years crucial documents 
are missing and the thousands of pages of records and correspondence 
reviewed often do not provide clear answers.”327  As Judge McMahon of 
the district court noted: “[m]atters of provenance are notoriously 
complicated, and the circumstances under which the Paintings made their 
way to MoMA (as alleged by Plaintiffs) made the museum’s 
investigation difficult.”328  Ownership decisions, even those made on 
technical grounds like the statute of limitations, turn on context-sensitive 
facts that require historical analysis to understand.  These issues are not 
appropriately decided on a motion to dismiss, filed early in the case.  
Courts should allow the full light of history to illuminate the record to 
determine whether a Holocaust-era art complaint is plausible and should 
survive a motion to dismiss.  More specifically, because provenance 
evidence is highly relevant to the resolution of disputes over rightful 
ownership, courts should not treat such evidence as confidential or 
privileged, or—as the district court did in this case—”rank hearsay” 
unworthy of supporting an allegation in a complaint filed before the 
discovery process even begins.  Doing so is not only improper as a 
matter of procedure, but it endorses a false view of historical reality and 
distorts the historical record. 
C. Obstacles to Claims that Survive a Motion to Dismiss 
Even surmounting a motion to dismiss or motion for summary 
judgment does not guarantee a survivor or heir success.  Bakalar v. 
Vavra is a dispute between the heirs of Fritz Grunbaum and David 
                                                          
 324.  Id. at *49. 
 325.  Id. at *55. 
 326.  See supra Part II. 
 327.  Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 285, at *18. 
 328.  Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473, 493 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 403 F. App’x 
575 (2d Cir. 2010), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 102 (2011). 
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Bakalar, who filed an action for declaratory judgment, tortious 
interference with contractual relations, and slander of title with regard to 
Seated Woman with Bent Left Leg (Torso), a drawing by Egon Schiele.329  
Fritz Grunbaum, prominent Jewish entertainer in Vienna with a 
significant art collection, was arrested eight days after the March 12, 
1938, Anschluss.330  He was shipped to the Dachau concentration camp 
where he was forced to sign a power of attorney certificate before he 
died, on January 14, 1941, to provide his wife, Elisabeth, with the legal 
power to claim his assets and file property declarations in accordance 
with Nazi law.331 
In a report dated four days after the execution of the power of attorney, 
Franz Kieslinger, an appraiser for the Nazis with the Viennese auction 
house Dorotheum—which was ‘a prime selling point of loot[ed] art in 
Austria’ . . .[—]conducted an appraisal of the 449 artworks that 
Grunbaum kept in his apartment . . . .332 
Before being arrested and shipped off to her death in the Minsk 
concentration camp in October 1942, Elisabeth was forced to sign an 
inventory in accordance with the power of attorney, which adopted 
Kieslinger’s exact valuation on the art collection.333  Later she signed 
Fritz’s death certificate, which stated that “there is no estate . . . [and] in 
the absence of an estate, there are no estate-related proceedings.”334 
Eberhard Kornfeld, a partner in the Swiss art gallery Gutekunst & 
Klipstein founded by Otto Kallir, acquired Fritz’s artworks.335  The 
gallery is known to have sold artworks seized by the Nazis.336  It sold the 
Schiele drawing, approximately six months after purchasing it in 1956, to 
a New York gallery, which subsequently sold it to David Bakalar in 
1963.337 
                                                          
 329. No. 05 Civ. 3037 (WHP) 2008 WL 4067335, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2008), vacated, 619 
F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2010), remanded to 819 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, No. 11-4042-cv, 
2012 WL 4820801 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2012).  The tortious interference and slander of title claims have 
since been dropped. 
 330. Id. at *3. 
 331. Id.; Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., concurring) 
(discussing how Grunbaum was forced to execute the power of attorney). 
 332.  Bakalar, 619 F.3d at 138 (majority opinion). 
 333.  Id. 
 334. Bakalar, 2008 WL 4067335, at *4. 
 335. See supra Part IV.C. 
 336. Vivian Endicott Barnett, Rereading the Correspondence: Rebay and Kandinsky, in ART OF 
TOMORROW: HILLA REBAY AND SOLOMON R. GUGGENHEIM 86, 99 (2005). 
 337. Bakalar, 2008 WL 4067335, at *1.  Interestingly, in an earlier attempt to certify a defendant 
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After a trial on the merits, the court found that Bakalar’s title traced 
back to a sale by Fritz Grunbaum’s sister-in-law Mathilde Lukacs, whom 
the court found received the painting as a gift from Elisabeth and 
subsequently sold it to Kornfeld.338  Although adopted as fact by the trial 
court, Kornfeld’s testimony and the evidence of the 1956 sale have been 
questioned by Jonathan Petropolous, a prominent historian who has 
thoroughly researched Nazi-era trafficking and who was hired by the 
Grunbaum heirs.339  Under the trial court’s theory, the power of attorney 
signed by Fritz Grunbaum in Dachau must have given Elisabeth the 
power to make a valid gift of the painting to his sister-in-law in Nazi 
Vienna—after Fritz died intestate and shortly before Elisabeth was 
shipped off to her death. 
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case.340  The Second 
Circuit found that the district court erred under New York law in its 
choice of law analysis—New York law should have controlled, not 
Swiss law341—and by placing the burden of proof as to title on the 
claimant.342  The court noted that New York case law places the onerous 
“burden of investigating the provenance of a work of art on the potential 
purchaser,”343 to prevent New York, the largest art market in the world, 
from fostering trafficking of stolen art.344  The Second Circuit found that 
the trial court erred in concluding that the “Grunbaum heirs had failed to 
produce ‘any concrete evidence that the Nazis looted the Drawing or that 
it was otherwise taken from Grunbaum.’”345  The court continued: “Our 
                                                                                                                       
 
class of present-day possessors of Fritz Grunbaum’s art, the Grunbaum heirs sought discovery from 
Galerie St. Etienne, Sotheby’s, and Christie’s to identify owners or possessors of artworks 
previously belonging to Fritz Grunbaum and provenance documents for those artworks, an attempt 
that the trial court disallowed.  Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 338. Bakalar, 2008 WL 4067335, at *2. 
 339. See Supplemental Expert Opinion, Bakalar v. Vavra, 2008 WL 4067335 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 
2008) (No. 05 Civ. 3037(WHP)) (admitted into the Record by the Second Circuit in March 2009) 
(on file with author). 
 340.  Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 2010), remanded to 819 F. Supp. 2d 293 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, No. 11-4042-cv, 2012 WL 4820801 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2012). 
 341.  Id. 
 342.  Id. at 147. 
 343.  Id. at 143 (quoting Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E. 2d 426, 431(N.Y. 
1991)).  The court also noted that New York’s governor vetoed a bill to change New York law on 
this point.  Id. at 142. 
 344.  Id.; see also id. at 144 (noting that this New York policy serves “as a means to preserve the 
integrity of transactions and prevent the state from becoming a marketplace for stolen goods” 
(quoting Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
 345.  Id. at 147 (quoting Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 05 Civ. 3037 (WHP), 2008 WL 4067335, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008)). 
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reading of the record suggests that there may be such evidence, and that 
the district judge, by applying Swiss Law, erred in placing the burden of 
proof on the Grubaum heirs in this regard.”346  The court did not provide 
detailed analysis of the factual record. 
The court went on to endorse the lower court’s denial of discovery 
related to the potential certification of a defendant class of possessors of 
artworks from the Grunbaum collection, finding that Judge Pauley of the 
district court did not engage in any abuse of discretion.347  The court also 
noted that “should the district judge conclude that the Grunbaum heirs 
are entitled to prevail on the issue of the validity of Bakalar’s title to the 
Drawing, the district judge should also address the issue of laches.”348 
Judge Korman wrote a separate concurrence to address the perceived 
errors in the trial court’s ruling, finding that the risks of writing dicta 
were outweighed by the need to direct the lower court judge to correctly 
interpret the factual evidence of Nazi looting.349  Judge Korman provided 
the following summary: 
Grunbaum was arrested while attempting to flee from the Nazis.  After 
his arrest, he never again had physical possession of any of his artwork, 
including the Drawing.  The power of attorney, which he was forced to 
execute while in the Dachau concentration camp, divested him of his 
legal control over the Drawing.  Such an involuntary divestiture of 
possession and legal control rendered any subsequent transfer void.350 
Judge Korman’s critique of the district court’s findings of fact, 
supporting the present-day possessor’s argument “that someone in the 
Grunbaum family more likely than not exported the Drawing from 
Vienna, is highly compelling.”351  Judge Korman further clarified: 
                                                          
 346.  Id. at 147. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Id. at 147.  On remand, the court dismissed the case on laches grounds.  Bakalar v. Vavra, 
819 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  The Second Circuit affirmed.  Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 11-
4042-cv, 2012 WL 4820801, at *3 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2012). 
 349.  Id. at 148 (Korman, J., concurring). 
 350.  Id.  Judge Korman distinguished this scenario from a bailment scenario where title could 
potentially pass to a subsequent good faith purchaser for value.  Id.  Judge Korman correctly pointed 
out that the lower court erred in applying U.C.C. § 2-403(1), which could only apply in voidable title 
bailment scenarios.  Id. at 149.  Because the power of attorney signed by Grunbaum was involuntary, 
“any subsequent transfer was void and not merely voidable.”  Id.  Judge Korman found an analogy 
in Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008), aff’g 529 F. Supp. 2d 300, 307 (D.R.I. 
2007), the only Nazi-looted art case in U.S. courts since 2004 in which a claimant was successful.  
Bakalar, 619 F.3d at 149 (Korman, J., concurring). 
 351.  Bakalar, 619 F.3d at 151 (Korman, J., concurring). 
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The district judge merely speculated that “[t]he Drawing could have 
been one of the 417 drawings Elisabeth Grunbaum possibly 
exported . . . in 1938,” or that the Drawing “could have been one of 
three drawings Lukacs’s husband exported,” or that “it could have 
been” one of the three watercolors exported by Lukacs’s brother-in-
law.  These scenarios, based on pure speculation, do not constitute 
findings by a preponderance of the evidence that what “could have” 
happened actually did happen.352 
Judge Korman also challenged Bakalar’s claim on appeal that there 
is no “direct evidence that all of the Schiele art sold by Lukacs had once 
belonged to Fritz Grunbaum,” or that “the Drawing belonged to Fritz 
Grunbaum prior to or during the war.”353  Judge Korman stated that 
“there is significant circumstantial evidence that this artwork had 
belonged to him.”354  Judge Korman pointed out that the underlying 
theories of the case had assumed as much, including deposition 
testimony of Kornfeld and the trial testimony of Jane Kallir, Otto Kallir’s 
daughter, and the current director of Galerie St. Etienne.355  The 2005 
Sotheby’s auction record that triggered the entire litigation stated as 
much as well.356  Bakalar’s initial complaint even admitted the same.357  
Unfortunately, on remand, the district court again found against Vavra 
and dismissed the case; the Second Circuit affirmed; a petition for 
rehearing en banc was filed.358 
V. CONCLUSION: COURTS SHOULD HEED HISTORY AND WELCOME 
HISTORIANS 
Even once courts understand the plausibility of the allegation that an 
artwork was stolen or subject to a forced sale during the Nazi era, it is 
likely that courts will still need assistance to evaluate the particular facts 
surrounding the asserted legal claims and defenses.  There is a risk that 
lawyers and judges lacking expertise in historical research who rely on 
                                                          
 352.  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 05 Civ. 3037 (WHP), 2008 WL 
4067335, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008)). 
 353.  Id. 
 354.  Id. 
 355.  Id. 
 356.  Id. 
 357.  Id. 
 358.   Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 11-4042-cv, 2012 WL 4820801 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2012); Petition for 
Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Bakalar, 2012 WL 4820801 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 
2012) (No. 11-4042-cv) (on file with author). 
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“law-office history,” will misinterpret facts.359  On the other hand, in one 
scholar’s view, 
[Judges] need advocates, and in some instances historians, to present 
the history.  The likelihood that the courts will produce credible 
decisions rooted in history increases dramatically when the effort is a 
partnership between the bench and bar, as opposed to an effort by one 
judge and one star-crossed law clerk.360 
Historians are increasingly being asked to offer their testimony in 
American courts as expert witnesses.361  Historians have participated in 
cases adjudicating a wide variety of claims, such as “gay rights, gender 
discrimination, voting rights, tobacco litigation, naturalization 
proceedings against defendants suspected of failing to disclose ties to 
organizations hostile to the United States, and Native-American hunting 
and fishing rights.”362  The use of historians’ testimony, like the 
testimony of all expert witnesses, is subject to the requirements of Rule 
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.363  Even assuming the evidentiary 
hurdle is overcome, historical explanations are subtle and complex 
interpretations of human experience; therefore, the historical method is at 
odds with the needs of the court, which ultimately requires categorical, 
definitive conclusions.364 
Although historians have been very useful in Nazi-looted art 
litigation, there is some risk to the historical record when an historian is 
forced, in our adversarial system, to reduce her research into sound bites 
or cloak advocacy as objective scholarship.365  This Article does not 
address proposed reforms to combat this problem, inherent in the use of 
any expert in our adversarial courts,366 but simply posits that judges 
                                                          
 359.  Jeffrey S. Sutton, Essay, The Role of History in Judging Disputes About the Meaning of the 
Constitution, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1173, 1185 (2009). 
 360.  Id. at 1188. 
 361.  Jonathan D. Martin, Historians at the Gate: Accommodating Expert Historical Testimony 
in Federal Courts, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1518, 1519 (2003). 
 362.  Maxine D. Goodman, Slipping Through The Gate: Trusting Daubert and Trial Procedures 
to Reveal the ‘Pseudo-Historian’ Expert Witness and to Enable the Reliable Historian Expert 
Witness—Troubling Lessons from Holocaust-Related Trials, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 824, 831 (2008) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 363.  Martin, supra note 361, at 1520. 
 364.  Id. at 1534–36. 
 365.  See Goodman, supra note 362, at 826 (defining a “pseudo-historian” as someone presented 
to the court as an expert but who relays propaganda instead of fact-based history). 
 366.  Many proposed reforms, such as those calling for panels of experts and sole reliance upon 
court-appointed experts would have practicality problems in the historical analysis of Holocaust-era 
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contemplating questions whether a particular artwork was looted, the 
ability of owners to reclaim their property, and the ability of purchasers 
to claim good faith purchaser status under foreign law should be 
informed by history—and reliance on historians may assist in developing 
the requisite knowledge to accurately assess the plausibility of the 
parties’ claims and defenses.367 
At the same time, courts listening to expert historians must be open-
minded because historical analysis, like much other science, is imperfect 
and research is highly subjective and built on a series of assumptions and 
inferences used to ferret out errors and inconsistencies.368  On the other 
hand, judges contemplating inconsistent interpretations of events 
proffered by opposing expert historians should not allow junk history to 
infect the historical record contained within judicial decisions.369  
Applying ordinary evidentiary safeguards should help combat this 
problem,370 as should certain safeguards appropriate when considering 
                                                                                                                       
 
expropriation and forced sales because of the small number of historians that are truly experts in the 
field.  See Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The 
Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 365 (2001) 
(calling for courts to form teams or panels of scientific reviewers akin to the academic peer review 
publication process); Anthony Champagne, et al., Are Court-Appointed Experts the Solution to the 
Problems of Expert Testimony?, 84 JUDICATURE 178, 183 (2001) (calling for court-appointment of 
experts); Michael Connolly & John Muir, Special Masters, Court-Appointed Experts and Technical 
Advisors in Federal Court, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 77, 77 (2009) (calling for court appointment); Sophia 
Cope, Ripe for Revision: A Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and the Use of Court-
Appointed Experts, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 163, 170–77 (2004) (offering critique of oft-advocated 
reform).  But see Robert L. Hess, II, Judges Cooperating with Scientists: A Proposal for More 
Effective Limits on the Federal Trial Judge’s Inherent Power to Appoint Technical Advisors, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 547, 549 (2001) (arguing that court appointments inappropriately give judicial power 
to third parties, and parties’ power to judges); N.E.H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, Historians and 
the Impeachment Imbroglio: In Search of a Serviceable History, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 473, 489–90 
(2000) (calling for Congress to appoint historians to special committees attending to issues of great 
public importance where understanding historical context is key). 
 367.  See generally Reuel E. Schiller, The Strawhorsemen of the Apocolypse: Relativism and the 
Historian as Expert Witness, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1169, 1176 (1998) (exposing the theory that 
historians are under so much attack outside of court that their credibility already comes under intense 
scrutiny in court). 
 368.  Beyea & Berger, supra note 366, at 332. 
 369.  Cf. Jeffrey Lynch Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current 
Controls, and Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2001) (noting that the adversarial 
system allows for “hired-gun” experts and generates significant social cost). 
 370.  See generally Miles J. Vigilante, Screening Expert Testimony After Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 543 (2000) (discussing evidentiary standards regularly applicable to 
experts); Stephen D. Easton, That Is Not All There Is: Enhancing Daubert Exclusion By Applying 
“Ordinary” Witness Principles to Experts, 84 NEB. L. REV. 675 (2006) (advocating for use of 
heightened safeguards such as would be applied to nonexpert witnesses). 
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testimony from social scientists.371  When considering testimony from an 
historian, courts should pay heed to whether the purported scholar treated 
sources with skeptical reservation; did not automatically disregard 
contrary evidence; was balanced in her treatment of the evidence and did 
not cherry-pick; highlighted speculations; did not omit any part of a 
relevant document; weighed the authenticity of everything, not just the 
accounts in contradictions; and considered the motives of all historical 
actors.372 
Almost every Nazi-looted art claim since 2004 has been dismissed 
on technical grounds, most commonly the statute of limitations.373  But 
how are these courts determining whether the claimants should be given 
a chance to be heard?  The courts usually rely on evidence such as sales 
records of the art submitted by the museums and Nazi-looted art 
possessors.  But what if the evidence is falsified, no matter how legal it 
appears? 
From the confiscation process within the Reich evolved a complex 
system of mutual consultation between officials, which also incorporated 
private institutions such as banks and insurance companies within the 
network.374  The system, developed for the phase of emigration, was 
thereby adapted for the confiscation of the property of German Jew 
deportees.375  Its goal was to achieve complete exploitation of Jewish 
property by enforcing “legal” confiscation under the Eleventh Decree, 
itself an extension of previous denaturalization and confiscation 
policies.376  The very scale of the measures taken to seize and distribute 
Jewish property demonstrates both widespread knowledge of the 
deportations and the crucial legal aspect of the Final Solution.377 
                                                          
 371.  See Wendie Ellen Schneider, Note, Past Imperfect, 110 YALE L.J. 1531 (2001) (arguing for 
the application of a “conscientious historian” standard in American cases employing historians as 
expert witnesses). 
 372.  See id. at 1540 (describing how the conscientious historian standard would work in 
practice).  Cf. Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, 
Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2009) (critiquing Justice Scalia’s having engaged 
in faulty historical analysis to announce “new originalism”); Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The 
Use and Abuse of History in The District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (2008) 
(accusing Justice Scalia of having failed to employ standards of acceptable historical scholarship in 
utilizing “atypical texts” and dismissing or ignoring influential countervailing historical scholarship). 
 373.  See supra Part II; see also Brief for Am. Jewish Congress as Amici Curiae, supra note 286, 
at a-7 app.B, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628670. 
 374.  See DEAN, supra note 109, at 245. 
 375.  Id. at 110. 
 376.  Id. 
 377.  Id. at 256. 
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We cannot expect judges to understand all aspects of the complicated 
history behind Nazi-looted art.  Even expert historians in the field require 
a significant amount of time to complete any successful provenance 
research.  However, judges in this country need to understand why they 
should welcome historians as expert witnesses in Nazi-looted art cases, 
how the history should never be overlooked in these cases, and how the 
historians sometimes are the only ones able to accurately analyze 
documentation from the relevant period.  What at first does not seem to 
comport with common sense, may do so, once one is fully informed. 
 
VI. APPENDIX: FEDERAL HOLOCAUST-ERA ART CLAIMS SINCE 2004, 
UPDATED BY JENNIFER ANGLIM KREDER OCTOBER 26, 2012 
 
Cases Lost by Holocaust Victims or Their Heirs 
 
 Case Name Case Number Citation or Court in 
Which Pending 
Disposition 
1 Bakalar v.  
Vavra 
11-4042-cv 2012 WL 4820801 
(2d Cir. Oct. 11, 
2012).    
Claimant lost after trial, 
incorrect choice-of-law, 
burden of proof analysis 
and interpretations of fact 
indicative of Nazi looting.  
Second Circuit reversed.  
On remand, claimant lost 
again.  Second Circuit 
affirmed. 





07-56691 592 F.3d 954 (9th 
Cir. Jan. 14, 2010). 
Court struck down all 
claims filed pursuant to 
California statute 
extending limitations 
period to 2010 and 
remanded to determine 
whether statute of 
limitations has run on 
common law conversion 
claim.  Solicitor General 
recommended SCOTUS 
deny certiorari, which 
SCOTUS did. Defendants 
on remand filed a motion 
to dismiss, which was 
granted by the court. 
3 Westfield v. 
Fed. Republic 
of Germany 
09-6010 633 F.3d 409 (6th 
Cir. 2011). 
Court ruled that Germany 
could not be sued under 
Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) for 
any taking of property 
during the war on the 
ground that the taking had 
no “direct effect” in the 
U.S.  Sixth Circuit 
affirmed.   
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4 Grosz v. 
Museum of 
Modern Art  
09-CV-3706 
(CM) 
403 F. App’x. 575 
(2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 
102 (2011).   
Court granted museum’s 
motion to dismiss the on 
ground that recently 
exchanged letters triggered 
demand and refusal such 
that the statute of 
limitations just barely ran 
out.  Affirmed on appeal. 
SCOTUS denied petition 
for certiorari. 
5 Museum of 
Fine Arts, 
Bos. v. Seger- 
Thomschitz 
09-1922 623 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 1612 
(2011), reh’g 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 
2176 (2011).    
Court granted museum’s 
motion for summary 
judgment declaring its 
superior interest in 
painting.  Affirmed on 
appeal.  SCOTUS denied 
petition for certiorari and 
petition for rehearing.   
6 Dunbar v. 
Seger- 
Thomschitz 
09-30717 615 F.3d 574 (5th 
Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1511 (2011).   
Prescriptive ownership by 
present-day possessor 
under Louisiana law; 
motion for summary 
judgment granted.  
Affirmed on appeal.  
SCOTUS denied petition 
for certiorari.   
7 Orkin v.  
Taylor 
05-55364 487 F.3d 734 (9th 
Cir. 2007), cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 
990 (2007).   
Holocaust Victims Redress 
Act did not create a private 
right of action.  State law 
claims barred by statute of 
limitations. Affirmed on 
appeal.  SCOTUS denied 
certiorari.   
8 Detroit Inst. 
of Arts v. 
Ullin 
06-10333 2007 WL 1016996 
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 
31, 2007). 
Declaratory judgment 
issued to museum and 
claimants’ state law claims 
dismissed on statute of 
limitations grounds (claim 
accrued in 1938 and 
expired in 1941, before the 
end of WWII).   
9 Toledo 
Museum of 
Art v. Ullin 
3:06 CV 7031 477 F. Supp. 2d 802 
(N.D. Ohio 2006) 
Declaratory judgment 
issued to museum and 
claimants’ state law claims 
dismissed on statute of 
limitations grounds.  
Analysis similar, but not 
identical to Detroit Inst. of 
Arts v. Ullin.   
10 Orkin v. 
Swiss 
Confederation 
11-1414-cv 444 F. App’x 469 
(2d Cir. 2011).   
Court granted motion to 
dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction under FSIA 
and Alien Tort Statute.  
Affirmed on appeal.   
11 In re 
Flamenbaum 
 
2012 N.Y. Slip 
Op. 04165 
95 A.D. 3d 1318 
(N.Y. App. Div. 
May 30, 2012). 
Vorderasiatisches Museum 
action for declaratory 
judgment and replevin of a 
gold tablet dated back to 
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the 13th century BC in 
possession of the 
Flamenbaum estate. The 
court found it was not 
barred from laches theory 
and reversed the lower 
court’s opinion, and found 
that the museum had legal 
title and a superior right to 
the tablet.   
 
Cases Won by Holocaust Victims or Their Heirs in Federal Court 
 
 Case Name Case Number Citation or Court in 
Which Pending 
Disposition 




08-1136 548 F.3d 50 (1st 
Cir. 2008).   
Affirmed District of Rhode 
Island summary judgment 
in favor or claimant.  Only 
case won by a claimant in 
federal court since 2004.   






(N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 
2011).  
Civil forfeiture action filed 
against Romanino painting 
located at the Mary 
Brogam Museum of Art in 
Tallahassee, Florida.  
Allegations are that the 
painting was imported 
contrary to law and 
smuggled into the country 
contrary to law.  Italy 
defaulted on seizure.   
 
 
Cases Settled After Complaint Filed in Federal Court 
 
 Case Name Case Number Citation or Court in 
Which Pending 
Disposition 
1 Museum of 




07 Civ. 11074 
(JSR) 
549 F. Supp. 2d 543 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).     
Case settled on the eve of 
trial.   







362 F. Supp. 2d 
1175 (C.D. Cal. 
2005).   
Case settled after present-
day possessor filed a 
declaratory action against 
the claimant.  Claimant had 
removed the painting from 
California on the eve of a 
hearing for a temporary 
restraining order in the 
state court case filed by the 
claimant.  The California 
trial court judge then 
dismissed the California 
state case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  
The U.S. government then 
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filed this civil forfeiture 
action seizing the painting.  
The case then settled. 





03-13 541 U.S. 677 
(2004). 
FSIA allows jurisdiction 
over foreign sovereign 
regardless of whether the 
conduct at issue predates 
FSIA.  Claimant won after 
consenting to arbitration in 
Vienna.   
4 In re “Portrait 
of Wally” 
99 Cv. 9940 
(LAP) 
663 F. Supp. 2d 232 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
Civil forfeiture action filed 
in 1999 after grand jury 
subpoena to seize painting 
was quashed in state court 
in 1998.  District Court 
denied cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  Case 
settled on eve of trial. 
5 In re Irene 
Korhumel  
No. 11-cv-5557 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 
2011).   
The Estate of Irenen 
Korhumel sued for the 
official rights of the Renoir 
painting, Paysage Pres de 
Cagnes.  Richard Semmel, 
the original owner, was 
forced to sell his art 
collection after he was cut 
off from his business and 
therefore his income.  
Therefore, it was a 
question of whether the 
Korhumels or the heirs of 
Semmel owned the 
painting. After the 
complaint was filed, the 





Cases Still Pending in District Court 
 
 Case Name Case Number Citation or Court in 
Which Pending 
Disposition 









616 F.3d 1019 (9th 
Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 
3057 (2011).   
Court denied Spain’s 
motion to dismiss on FSIA 
ground under the 
expropriation exception.  
Solicitor General 
recommended SCOTUS 
deny certiorari, which 
SCOTUS did. 





10-1261 (ESH) 808 F. Supp.2d 113 
(D.D.C. 2011).  
Court denied motion to 
dismiss except as to a 
small number of paintings 
that were the subject of 
prior proceedings in 
Hungary. 
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3 Maestracci v. 
“Seated Man 
With a Cane” 
11 CIV 7710 2011 WL 5142960 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 
2011). 
Action for declaratory 
judgment and replevin of 
Modigliani painting 
located at the Helly 
Nahmad Gallery in New 
York City. 
4 Victims of 
Holocaust Art 




(S.D. Fla. April 19, 
2012). 
Action for declaratory 
judgment and restitution or 
replevin, or both, of “The 
Popper Collection.” 
5 Fischer v. 
Erste Grp. 
Bank  
CV 12-3328 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 
2012). 
Action for declaratory 
judgment and restitution or 
replevin, or both, of the 
contents of a safety deposit 
box.  Action for restitution 
for value of the bank 
accounts, loss of a 
mortgaged building, lost 
salary, pension and other 
employment benefits. 
 
 
 
